BACKGROUND: Tobacco smoking is the leading preventable cause of death worldwide, which makes it essential to stimulate smoking cessation. The financial cost of smoking cessation treatment can act as a barrier to those seeking support. We hypothesised that provision of financial assistance for people trying to quit smoking, or reimbursement of their care providers, could lead to an increased rate of successful quit attempts. This is an update of the original 2005 review.
OBJECTIVES: The primary objective of this review was to assess the impact of reducing the costs for tobacco smokers or healthcare providers for using or providing smoking cessation treatment through healthcare financing interventions on abstinence from smoking. The secondary objectives were to examine the effects of different levels of financial support on the use or prescription of smoking cessation treatment, or both, and on the number of smokers making a quit attempt (quitting smoking for at least 24 hours). We also assessed the cost effectiveness of different financial interventions, and analysed the costs per additional quitter, or per quality-adjusted life year (QALY) gained.
SEARCH METHODS: We searched the Cochrane Tobacco Addiction Group Specialised Register in September 2016.
SELECTION CRITERIA: We considered randomised controlled trials (RCTs), controlled trials and interrupted time series studies involving financial benefit interventions to smokers or their healthcare providers, or both.
DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS: Two reviewers independently extracted data and assessed the quality of the included studies. We calculated risk ratios (RR) for individual studies on an intention-to-treat basis and performed meta-analysis using a random-effects model.
MAIN RESULTS: In the current update, we have added six new relevant studies, resulting in a total of 17 studies included in this review involving financial interventions directed at smokers or healthcare providers, or both.Full financial interventions directed at smokers had a favourable effect on abstinence at six months or longer when compared to no intervention (RR 1.77, 95% CI 1.37 to 2.28, I² = 33%, 9333 participants). There was no evidence that full coverage interventions increased smoking abstinence compared to partial coverage interventions (RR 1.02, 95% CI 0.71 to 1.48, I² = 64%, 5914 participants), but partial coverage interventions were more effective in increasing abstinence than no intervention (RR 1.27 95% CI 1.02 to 1.59, I² = 21%, 7108 participants). The economic evaluation showed costs per additional quitter ranging from USD 97 to USD 7646 for the comparison of full coverage with partial or no coverage.There was no clear evidence of an effect on smoking cessation when we pooled two trials of financial incentives directed at healthcare providers (RR 1.16, CI 0.98 to 1.37, I² = 0%, 2311 participants).Full financial interventions increased the number of participants making a quit attempt when compared to no interventions (RR 1.11, 95% CI 1.04 to 1.17, I² = 15%, 9065 participants). There was insufficient evidence to show whether partial financial interventions increased quit attempts compared to no interventions (RR 1.13, 95% CI 0.98 to 1.31, I² = 88%, 6944 participants).Full financial interventions increased the use of smoking cessation treatment compared to no interventions with regard to various pharmacological and behavioural treatments: nicotine replacement therapy (NRT): RR 1.79, 95% CI 1.54 to 2.09, I² = 35%, 9455 participants; bupropion: RR 3.22, 95% CI 1.41 to 7.34, I² = 71%, 6321 participants; behavioural therapy: RR 1.77, 95% CI 1.19 to 2.65, I² = 75%, 9215 participants.There was evidence that partial coverage compared to no coverage reported a small positive effect on the use of bupropion (RR 1.15, 95% CI 1.03 to 1.29, I² = 0%, 6765 participants). Interventions directed at healthcare providers increased the use of behavioural therapy (RR 1.69, 95% CI 1.01 to 2.86, I² = 85%, 25820 participants), but not the use of NRT and/or bupropion (RR 0.94, 95% CI 0.76 to 1.18, I² = 6%, 2311 participants).We assessed the quality of the evidence for the main outcome, abstinence from smoking, as moderate. In most studies participants were not blinded to the different study arms and researchers were not blinded to the allocated interventions. Furthermore, there was not always sufficient information on attrition rates. We detected some imprecision but we judged this to be of minor consequence on the outcomes of this study.
AUTHORS' CONCLUSIONS: Full financial interventions directed at smokers when compared to no financial interventions increase the proportion of smokers who attempt to quit, use smoking cessation treatments, and succeed in quitting. There was no clear and consistent evidence of an effect on smoking cessation from financial incentives directed at healthcare providers. We are only moderately confident in the effect estimate because there was some risk of bias due to a lack of blinding in participants and researchers, and insufficient information on attrition rates.
Background: Outpatient care facilities provide a variety of basic healthcare services to individuals who do not require hospitalisation or institutionalisation, and are usually the patient's first contact. The provision of outpatient care contributes to immediate and large gains in health status, and a large portion of total health expenditure goes to outpatient healthcare services. Payment method is one of the most important incentive methods applied by purchasers to guide the performance of outpatient care providers. Objectives: To assess the impact of different payment methods on the performance of outpatient care facilities and to analyse the differences in impact of payment methods in different settings. Search methods: We searched the Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials (CENTRAL), 2016, Issue 3, part of the Cochrane Library (searched 8 March 2016); MEDLINE, OvidSP (searched 8 March 2016); Embase, OvidSP (searched 24 April 2014); PubMed (NCBI) (searched 8 March 2016); Dissertations and Theses Database, ProQuest (searched 8 March 2016); Conference Proceedings Citation Index (ISI Web of Science) (searched 8 March 2016); IDEAS (searched 8 March 2016); EconLit, ProQuest (searched 8 March 2016); POPLINE, K4Health (searched 8 March 2016); China National Knowledge Infrastructure (searched 8 March 2016); Chinese Medicine Premier (searched 8 March 2016); OpenGrey (searched 8 March 2016); ClinicalTrials.gov, US National Institutes of Health (NIH) (searched 8 March 2016); World Health Organization (WHO) International Clinical Trials Registry Platform (ICTRP) (searched 8 March 2016); and the website of the World Bank (searched 8 March 2016). In addition, we searched the reference lists of included studies and carried out a citation search for the included studies via ISI Web of Science to find other potentially relevant studies. We also contacted authors of the main included studies regarding any further published or unpublished work. Selection criteria: Randomised trials, non-randomised trials, controlled before-after studies, interrupted time series, and repeated measures studies that compared different payment methods for outpatient health facilities. We defined outpatient care facilities in this review as facilities that provide health services to individuals who do not require hospitalisation or institutionalisation. We only included methods used to transfer funds from the purchaser of healthcare services to health facilities (including groups of individual professionals). These include global budgets, line-item budgets, capitation, fee-for-service (fixed and unconstrained), pay for performance, and mixed payment. The primary outcomes were service provision outcomes, patient outcomes, healthcare provider outcomes, costs for providers, and any adverse effects. Data collection and analysis: At least two review authors independently extracted data and assessed the risk of bias. We conducted a structured synthesis. We first categorised the comparisons and outcomes and then described the effects of different types of payment methods on different categories of outcomes. We used a fixed-effect model for meta-analysis within a study if a study included more than one indicator in the same category of outcomes. We used a random-effects model for meta-analysis across studies. If the data for meta-analysis were not available in some studies, we calculated the median and interquartile range. We reported the risk ratio (RR) for dichotomous outcomes and the relative change for continuous outcomes. Main results: We included 21 studies from Afghanistan, Burundi, China, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Tanzania, the United Kingdom, and the United States of health facilities providing primary health care and mental health care. There were three kinds of payment comparisons. 1) Pay for performance (P4P) combined with some existing payment method (capitation or different kinds of input-based payment) compared to the existing payment method We included 18 studies in this comparison, however we did not include five studies in the effects analysis due to high risk of bias. From the 13 studies, we found that the extra P4P incentives probably slightly improved the health professionals' use of some tests and treatments (adjusted RR median = 1.095, range 1.01 to 1.17; moderate-certainty evidence), and probably led to little or no difference in adherence to quality assurance criteria (adjusted percentage change median = -1.345%, range -8.49% to 5.8%; moderate-certainty evidence). We also found that P4P incentives may have led to little or no difference in patients' utilisation of health services (adjusted RR median = 1.01, range 0.96 to 1.15; low-certainty evidence) and may have led to little or no difference in the control of blood pressure or cholesterol (adjusted RR = 1.01, range 0.98 to 1.04; low-certainty evidence). 2) Capitation combined with P4P compared to fee-for-service (FFS) One study found that compared with FFS, a capitated budget combined with payment based on providers' performance on antibiotic prescriptions and patient satisfaction probably slightly reduced antibiotic prescriptions in primary health facilities (adjusted RR 0.84, 95% confidence interval 0.74 to 0.96; moderate-certainty evidence). 3) Capitation compared to FFS Two studies compared capitation to FFS in mental health centres in the United States. Based on these studies, the effects of capitation compared to FFS on the utilisation and costs of services were uncertain (very low-certainty evidence). Authors' conclusions: Our review found that if policymakers intend to apply P4P incentives to pay health facilities providing outpatient services, this intervention will probably lead to a slight improvement in health professionals' use of tests or treatments, particularly for chronic diseases. However, it may lead to little or no improvement in patients' utilisation of health services or health outcomes. When considering using P4P to improve the performance of health facilities, policymakers should carefully consider each component of their P4P design, including the choice of performance measures, the performance target, payment frequency, if there will be additional funding, whether the payment level is sufficient to change the behaviours of health providers, and whether the payment to facilities will be allocated to individual professionals. Unfortunately, the studies included in this review did not help to inform those considerations. Well-designed comparisons of different payment methods for outpatient health facilities in low- and middle-income countries and studies directly comparing different designs (e.g. different payment levels) of the same payment method (e.g. P4P or FFS) are needed.
Objective Financial incentives are seen as one approach to encourage more systematic use of smoking cessation interventions by healthcare professionals. A systematic review was conducted to examine the evidence for this. Methods Medline, Embase, PsychINFO, Cochrane Library, ISI Web of Science and sources of grey literature were used as data sources. Studies were included if they reported the effects of any financial incentive provided to healthcare professionals to undertake smoking cessation-related activities. Data extraction and quality assessment for each study were conducted by one reviewer and checked by a second. A total of 18 studies were identified, consisting of 3 randomised controlled trials and 15 observational studies. All scored in the mid range for quality. In all, 8 studies examined smoking cessation activities alone and 10 studied the UK's Quality and Outcomes Framework targeting quality measures for chronic disease management including smoking recording or cessation activities. Five non-Quality and Outcomes Framework studies examined the effects of financial incentives on individual doctors and three examined effects on groups of healthcare professionals based in clinics and general practices. Most studies showed improvements in recording smoking status and smoking cessation advice. Five studies examined the impact of financial incentives on quit rates and longerterm abstinence and these showed mixed results. Conclusions Financial incentives appear to improve recording of smoking status, and increase the provision of cessation advice and referrals to stop smoking services. Currently there is not sufficient evidence to show that financial incentives lead to reductions in smoking rates.
BACKGROUND: Pay-for-performance (P4P) intents to stimulate both more effective and more efficient health care delivery. To date, evidence on whether P4P itself is an efficient method has not been systematically analyzed.
OBJECTIVE: To identify and analyze the existing literature regarding economic evaluation of P4P.
DATA SOURCES: English, German, Spanish, and Turkish language literature were searched in the following databases: Business Source Complete, the Cochrane Library, Econlit, ISI web of knowledge, Medline (via PubMed), and PsycInfo (January 2000-April 2010).
STUDY SELECTION: Articles published in peer-reviewed journals and describing economic evaluations of P4P initiatives. Full economic evaluations, considering costs and consequences of the P4P intervention simultaneously, were the prime focus. Additionally, comparative partial evaluations were included if costs were described and the study allows for an assessment of consequences. Both experimental and observational studies were considered.
RESULTS: In total, nine studies could be identified. Three studies could be regarded as full economic evaluations, and six studies were classified as partial economic evaluations. Based on the full economic evaluations, P4P efficiency could not be demonstrated. Partial economic evaluations showed mixed results, but several flaws limit their significance. Ranges of costs and consequences were typically narrow, and programs differed considerably in design. Methodological quality assessment showed scores between 32% and 65%.
CONCLUSION: The results show that evidence on the efficiency of P4P is scarce and inconclusive. P4P efficiency could not be demonstrated. The small number and variability of included studies limit the strength of our conclusions. More research addressing P4P efficiency is needed.
BACKGROUND: Improving the quality of care is essential and a priority for patients, surgeons, and healthcare providers. Strategies to improve quality have been proposed at the national level either through accreditation standards or through national payment schemes; however, their effectiveness in improving quality is controversial.
QUESTIONS/PURPOSES: The purpose of this review was to address three questions: (1) does pay-for-performance improve the quality of care; (2) do surgical safety checklists improve the quality of surgical care; and (3) do practice guidelines improve the quality of care? These three strategies were chosen because there has been some research assessing their effectiveness in improving quality, and implementation had been attempted on a large scale such as entire countries.
METHODS: We performed a literature review from 1950 forward using Medline to identify Level I and II studies. We evaluated the three strategies and their effects on processes and outcomes of care. When possible, we examined strategy implementation, patients, and systems, including provider characteristics, which may affect the relationship between intervention and outcomes with a focus on factors that may have influenced effect size.
RESULTS: Pay-for-performance improved the process and to a lesser extent the outcome of care. Surgical checklists reduced morbidity and mortality. Explicit practice guidelines influenced the process and to a lesser extent the outcome of care. Although not definitively showed, clinician involvement during development of intervention and outcomes, with explicit strategies for communication and implementation, appears to increase the likelihood of positive results.
CONCLUSION: Although the cost-effectiveness of these three strategies is unknown, quality of care could be enhanced by implementing pay-for-performance, surgical safety checklists, and explicit practice guidelines. However, this review identified that the effectiveness of these strategies is highly context-specific.
BACKGROUND: The use of blended payment schemes in primary care, including the use of financial incentives to directly reward ‘performance’ and ‘quality’ is increasing in a number of countries. There are many examples in the US, and the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QoF) for general practitioners (GPs) in the UK is an example of a major system-wide reform. Despite the popularity of these schemes, there is currently little rigorous evidence of their success in improving the quality of primary health care, or of whether such an approach is cost-effective relative to other ways to improve the quality of care.
OBJECTIVES: The aim of this review is to examine the effect of changes in the method and level of payment on the quality of care provided by primary care physicians (PCPs) and to identify:
i) the different types of financial incentives that have improved quality;
ii) the characteristics of patient populations for whom quality of care has been improved by financial incentives; and
iii) the characteristics of PCPs who have responded to financial incentives.
SEARCH STRATEGY: We searched the Cochrane Effective Practice and Organisation of Care (EPOC) Trials Register, Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials (CENTRAL) and Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews (CDSR) (The Cochrane Library), MEDLINE, HealthSTAR, EMBASE, CINAHL, PsychLIT, and ECONLIT. Searches of Internet-based economics and health economics working paper collections were also conducted. Finally, studies were identified through the reference lists of retrieved articles, websites of key organisations, and from direct contact with key authors in the field. Articles were included if they were published from 2000 to August 2009.
SELECTION CRITERIA: Randomised controlled trials (RCT), controlled before and after studies (CBA), and interrupted time series analyses (ITS) evaluating the impact of different financial interventions on the quality of care delivered by primary healthcare physicians (PCPs). Quality of care was defined as patient reported outcome measures, clinical behaviours, and intermediate clinical and physiological measures.
DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS: Two review authors independently extracted data and assessed study quality, in consultation with two other review authors where there was disagreement. For each included study, we reported the estimated effect sizes and confidence intervals.
MAIN RESULTS: Seven studies were included in this review. Three of the studies evaluated single-threshold target payments, one examined a fixed fee per patient achieving a specified outcome, one study evaluated payments based on the relative ranking of medical groups’ performance (tournament-based pay), one study examined a mix of tournament-based pay and threshold payments, and one study evaluated changing from a blended payments scheme to salaried payment. Three cluster RCTs examined smoking cessation; one CBA examined patients' assessment of the quality of care; one CBA examined cervical screening, mammography screening, and HbA1c; one ITS focused on four outcomes in diabetes; and one controlled ITS (a difference-in-difference design) examined cervical screening, mammography screening, HbA1c, childhood immunisation, chlamydia screening, and appropriate asthma medication. Six of the seven studies showed positive but modest effects on quality of care for some primary outcome measures, but not all. One study found no effect on quality of care. Poor study design led to substantial risk of bias in most studies. In particular, none of the studies addressed issues of selection bias as a result of the ability of primary care physicians to select into or out of the incentive scheme or health plan.
AUTHORS' CONCLUSIONS: The use of financial incentives to reward PCPs for improving the quality of primary healthcare services is growing. However, there is insufficient evidence to support or not support the use of financial incentives to improve the quality of primary health care. Implementation should proceed with caution and incentive schemes should be more carefully designed before implementation. In addition to basing incentive design more on theory, there is a large literature discussing experiences with these schemes that can be used to draw out a number of lessons that can be learned and that could be used to influence or modify the design of incentive schemes. More rigorous study designs need to be used to account for the selection of physicians into incentive schemes. The use of instrumental variable techniques should be considered to assist with the identification of treatment effects in the presence of selection bias and other sources of unobserved heterogeneity. In randomised trials, care must be taken in using the correct unit of analysis and more attention should be paid to blinding. Studies should also examine the potential unintended consequences of incentive schemes by having a stronger theoretical basis, including a broader range of outcomes, and conducting more extensive subgroup analysis. Studies should more consistently describe i) the type of payment scheme at baseline or in the control group, ii) how payments to medical groups were used and distributed within the groups, and iii) the size of the new payments as a percentage of total revenue. Further research comparing the relative costs and effects of financial incentives with other behaviour change interventions is also required.
BACKGROUND: Pay-for-performance (P4P) is one of the primary tools used to support healthcare delivery reform. Substantial heterogeneity exists in the development and implementation of P4P in health care and its effects. This paper summarizes evidence, obtained from studies published between January 1990 and July 2009, concerning P4P effects, as well as evidence on the impact of design choices and contextual mediators on these effects. Effect domains include clinical effectiveness, access and equity, coordination and continuity, patient-centeredness, and cost-effectiveness.
METHODS: The systematic review made use of electronic database searching, reference screening, forward citation tracking and expert consultation. The following databases were searched: Cochrane Library, EconLit, Embase, Medline, PsychINFO, and Web of Science. Studies that evaluate P4P effects in primary care or acute hospital care medicine were included. Papers concerning other target groups or settings, having no empirical evaluation design or not complying with the P4P definition were excluded. According to study design nine validated quality appraisal tools and reporting statements were applied. Data were extracted and summarized into evidence tables independently by two reviewers.
RESULTS: One hundred twenty-eight evaluation studies provide a large body of evidence -to be interpreted with caution- concerning the effects of P4P on clinical effectiveness and equity of care. However, less evidence on the impact on coordination, continuity, patient-centeredness and cost-effectiveness was found. P4P effects can be judged to be encouraging or disappointing, depending on the primary mission of the P4P program: supporting minimal quality standards and/or boosting quality improvement. Moreover, the effects of P4P interventions varied according to design choices and characteristics of the context in which it was introduced.Future P4P programs should (1) select and define P4P targets on the basis of baseline room for improvement, (2) make use of process and (intermediary) outcome indicators as target measures, (3) involve stakeholders and communicate information about the programs thoroughly and directly, (4) implement a uniform P4P design across payers, (5) focus on both quality improvement and achievement, and (6) distribute incentives to the individual and/or team level.
CONCLUSIONS: P4P programs result in the full spectrum of possible effects for specific targets, from absent or negligible to strongly beneficial. Based on the evidence the review has provided further indications on how effect findings are likely to relate to P4P design choices and context. The provided best practice hypotheses should be tested in future research.
OBJECTIVES: A systematic review and meta-analysis was conducted to evaluate evidence-based strategies for increasing the delivery of smoking cessation treatments in primary care clinics.
METHODS: The review included studies published before January 1, 2009. The pooled odds-ratio (OR) was calculated for intervention group versus control group for practitioner performance for "5As" (Ask, Advise, Assess, Assist and Arrange) delivery and smoking abstinence. Multi-component interventions were defined as interventions which combined two or more intervention strategies.
RESULTS: Thirty-seven trials met eligibility criteria. Evidence from multiple large-scale trials was found to support the efficacy of multi-component interventions in increasing "5As" delivery. The pooled OR for multi-component interventions compared to control was 1.79 [95% CI 1.6-2.1] for "ask", 1.6 [95% CI 1.4-1.8] for "advice", 9.3 [95% CI 6.8-12.8] for "assist" (quit date) and 3.5 [95% CI 2.8-4.2] for "assist" (prescribe medications). Evidence was also found to support the value of practice-level interventions in increasing 5As delivery. Adjunct counseling [OR 1.7; 95% CI 1.5-2.0] and multi-component interventions [OR 2.2; 95% CI 1.7-2.8] were found to significantly increase smoking abstinence.
CONCLUSION: Multi-component interventions improve smoking outcomes in primary care settings. Future trials should attempt to isolate which components of multi-component interventions are required to optimize cost-effectiveness.
Tobacco smoking is the leading preventable cause of death worldwide, which makes it essential to stimulate smoking cessation. The financial cost of smoking cessation treatment can act as a barrier to those seeking support. We hypothesised that provision of financial assistance for people trying to quit smoking, or reimbursement of their care providers, could lead to an increased rate of successful quit attempts. This is an update of the original 2005 review.
OBJECTIVES:
The primary objective of this review was to assess the impact of reducing the costs for tobacco smokers or healthcare providers for using or providing smoking cessation treatment through healthcare financing interventions on abstinence from smoking. The secondary objectives were to examine the effects of different levels of financial support on the use or prescription of smoking cessation treatment, or both, and on the number of smokers making a quit attempt (quitting smoking for at least 24 hours). We also assessed the cost effectiveness of different financial interventions, and analysed the costs per additional quitter, or per quality-adjusted life year (QALY) gained.
SEARCH METHODS:
We searched the Cochrane Tobacco Addiction Group Specialised Register in September 2016.
SELECTION CRITERIA:
We considered randomised controlled trials (RCTs), controlled trials and interrupted time series studies involving financial benefit interventions to smokers or their healthcare providers, or both.
DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS:
Two reviewers independently extracted data and assessed the quality of the included studies. We calculated risk ratios (RR) for individual studies on an intention-to-treat basis and performed meta-analysis using a random-effects model.
MAIN RESULTS:
In the current update, we have added six new relevant studies, resulting in a total of 17 studies included in this review involving financial interventions directed at smokers or healthcare providers, or both.Full financial interventions directed at smokers had a favourable effect on abstinence at six months or longer when compared to no intervention (RR 1.77, 95% CI 1.37 to 2.28, I² = 33%, 9333 participants). There was no evidence that full coverage interventions increased smoking abstinence compared to partial coverage interventions (RR 1.02, 95% CI 0.71 to 1.48, I² = 64%, 5914 participants), but partial coverage interventions were more effective in increasing abstinence than no intervention (RR 1.27 95% CI 1.02 to 1.59, I² = 21%, 7108 participants). The economic evaluation showed costs per additional quitter ranging from USD 97 to USD 7646 for the comparison of full coverage with partial or no coverage.There was no clear evidence of an effect on smoking cessation when we pooled two trials of financial incentives directed at healthcare providers (RR 1.16, CI 0.98 to 1.37, I² = 0%, 2311 participants).Full financial interventions increased the number of participants making a quit attempt when compared to no interventions (RR 1.11, 95% CI 1.04 to 1.17, I² = 15%, 9065 participants). There was insufficient evidence to show whether partial financial interventions increased quit attempts compared to no interventions (RR 1.13, 95% CI 0.98 to 1.31, I² = 88%, 6944 participants).Full financial interventions increased the use of smoking cessation treatment compared to no interventions with regard to various pharmacological and behavioural treatments: nicotine replacement therapy (NRT): RR 1.79, 95% CI 1.54 to 2.09, I² = 35%, 9455 participants; bupropion: RR 3.22, 95% CI 1.41 to 7.34, I² = 71%, 6321 participants; behavioural therapy: RR 1.77, 95% CI 1.19 to 2.65, I² = 75%, 9215 participants.There was evidence that partial coverage compared to no coverage reported a small positive effect on the use of bupropion (RR 1.15, 95% CI 1.03 to 1.29, I² = 0%, 6765 participants). Interventions directed at healthcare providers increased the use of behavioural therapy (RR 1.69, 95% CI 1.01 to 2.86, I² = 85%, 25820 participants), but not the use of NRT and/or bupropion (RR 0.94, 95% CI 0.76 to 1.18, I² = 6%, 2311 participants).We assessed the quality of the evidence for the main outcome, abstinence from smoking, as moderate. In most studies participants were not blinded to the different study arms and researchers were not blinded to the allocated interventions. Furthermore, there was not always sufficient information on attrition rates. We detected some imprecision but we judged this to be of minor consequence on the outcomes of this study.
AUTHORS' CONCLUSIONS:
Full financial interventions directed at smokers when compared to no financial interventions increase the proportion of smokers who attempt to quit, use smoking cessation treatments, and succeed in quitting. There was no clear and consistent evidence of an effect on smoking cessation from financial incentives directed at healthcare providers. We are only moderately confident in the effect estimate because there was some risk of bias due to a lack of blinding in participants and researchers, and insufficient information on attrition rates.
