BACKGROUND: The proportion of total healthcare expenditures spent on drugs has continued to grow in countries of all income categories. Policy-makers are under pressure to control pharmaceutical expenditures without adversely affecting quality of care. Financial incentives seeking to influence prescribers' behaviour include budgetary arrangements at primary care and hospital settings (pharmaceutical budget caps or targets), financial rewards for target behaviours or outcomes (pay for performance interventions) and reduced benefit margin for prescribers based on medicine sales and prescriptions (pharmaceutical reimbursement rate reduction policies). This is the first update of the original version of this review.
OBJECTIVES: To determine the effects of pharmaceutical policies using financial incentives to influence prescribers' practices on drug use, healthcare utilisation, health outcomes and costs (expenditures).
SEARCH METHODS: We searched the Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials (CENTRAL) (searched 29/01/2015); MEDLINE, Ovid SP (searched 29/01/2015); EMBASE, Ovid SP (searched 29/01/2015); International Network for Rational Use of Drugs (INRUD) Bibliography (searched 29/01/2015); National Health Service (NHS) Economic Evaluation Database (searched 29/01/2015); EconLit - ProQuest (searched 02/02/2015); and Science Citation Index and Social Sciences Citation Index, Institute for Scientific Information (ISI) Web of Knowledge (citation search for included studies searched 10/02/2015). We screened the reference lists of relevant reports and contacted study authors and organisations to identify additional studies.
SELECTION CRITERIA: We included policies that intend to affect prescribing by means of financial incentives for prescribers. Included in this category are pharmaceutical budget caps or targets, pay for performance and drug reimbursement rate reductions and other financial policies, if they were specifically targeted at prescribing or drug utilisation. Policies in this review were defined as laws, rules, regulations and financial and administrative orders made or implemented by payers such as national or local governments, non-government organisations, private or social insurers and insurance-like organisations. One of the following outcomes had to be reported: drug use, healthcare utilisation, health outcomes or costs. The study had to be a randomised or non-randomised trial, an interrupted time series (ITS) analysis, a repeated measures study or a controlled before-after (CBA) study.
DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS: At least two review authors independently assessed eligibility for inclusion of studies and risks of bias using Cochrane Effective Practice and Organisation of Care (EPOC) criteria and extracted data from the included studies. For CBA studies, we reported relative effects (e.g. adjusted relative change). The review team re-analysed all ITS results. When possible, the review team also re-analysed CBA data as ITS data.
MAIN RESULTS: Eighteen evaluations (six new studies) of pharmaceutical policies from six high-income countries met our inclusion criteria. Fourteen studies evaluated pharmaceutical budget policies in the UK (nine studies), two in Germany and Ireland and one each in Sweden and Taiwan. Three studies assessed pay for performance policies in the UK (two) and the Netherlands (one). One study from Taiwan assessed a reimbursement rate reduction policy. ITS analyses had some limitations. All CBA studies had serious limitations. No study from low-income or middle-income countries met the inclusion criteria.Pharmaceutical budgets may lead to a modest reduction in drug use (median relative change -2.8%; low-certainty evidence). We are uncertain of the effects of the policy on drug costs or healthcare utilisation, as the certainty of such evidence has been assessed as very low. Effects of this policy on health outcomes were not reported. Effects of pay for performance policies on drug use and health outcomes are uncertain, as the certainty of such evidence has been assessed as very low. Effects of this policy on drug costs and healthcare utilisation have not been measured. Effects of the reimbursement rate reduction policy on drug use and drug costs are uncertain, as the certainty of such evidence has been assessed as very low. No included study assessed the effects of this policy on healthcare utilisation or health outcomes. Administration costs of the policies were not reported in any of the included studies.
AUTHORS' CONCLUSIONS: Although financial incentives are considered an important element in strategies to change prescribing patterns, limited evidence of their effects can be found. Effects of policies, including pay for performance policies, in improving quality of care and health outcomes remain uncertain. Because pharmaceutical policies have uncertain effects, and because they might cause harm as well as benefit, proper evaluation of these policies is needed. Future studies should consider the impact of these policies on health outcomes, drug use and overall healthcare expenditures, as well as on drug expenditures.
BACKGROUND: Most physicians and hospitals are paid the same regardless of the quality of the health care they provide. This produces no financial incentives and, in some cases, produces disincentives for quality. Increasing numbers of programs link payment to performance. PURPOSE: To systematically review studies assessing the effect of explicit financial incentives for improved performance on measures of health care quality. DATA SOURCES: PubMed search of English-language literature (1 January 1980 to 14 November 2005), and reference lists of retrieved articles. STUDY SELECTION: Empirical studies of the relationship between explicit financial incentives designed to improve health care quality and a quantitative measure of health care quality. DATA EXTRACTION: The authors categorized studies according to the level of the incentive (individual physician, provider group, or health care payment system) and the type of quality measure rewarded. DATA SYNTHESIS: Thirteen of 17 studies examined process-of-care quality measures, most of which were for preventive services. Five of the 6 studies of physician-level financial incentives and 7 of the 9 studies of provider group-level financial incentives found partial or positive effects on measures of quality. One of the 2 studies of incentives at the payment-system level found a positive effect on access to care, and 1 showed evidence of a negative effect on access to care for the sickest patients. In all, 4 studies suggested unintended effects of incentives. The authors found no studies examining the optimal duration of financial incentives for quality or the persistence of their effects after termination. Only 1 study addressed cost-effectiveness. LIMITATIONS: Few empirical studies of explicit financial incentives for quality were available for review. CONCLUSIONS: Ongoing monitoring of incentive programs is critical to determine the effectiveness of financial incentives and their possible unintended effects on quality of care. Further research is needed to guide implementation of financial incentives and to assess their cost-effectiveness.
OBJECTIVE: To review the impact of payment systems on the behaviour of primary care physicians. METHODS: All randomised trials, controlled before and after studies, and interrupted time series studies that compared capitation, salary, fee-for-service or target payments (mixed or separately) that were identified by computerised searches of the literature. Methodological quality assessment and data extraction were undertaken independently by two reviewers using a data checklist. Study results were qualitatively analysed. RESULTS: Six studies met the inclusion criteria. There was considerable variation in the quality of reporting, study setting and the range of outcomes measured. Fee-for-service resulted in a higher quantity of primary care services provided compared with capitation but the evidence of the impact on the quantity of secondary care services was mixed. Fee-for-service resulted in more patient visits, greater continuity of care, higher compliance with a recommended number of visits, but lower patient satisfaction with access to a physician compared with salary payment. The evidence of the impact of target payment on immunisation rates was inconclusive. CONCLUSIONS: There is some evidence to suggest that how a primary care physician is paid does affect his/her behaviour but the generalisability of these studies is unknown. Most policy changes in the area of payment systems are inadequately informed by research. Future changes to doctor payment systems need to be rigorously evaluated.
The proportion of total healthcare expenditures spent on drugs has continued to grow in countries of all income categories. Policy-makers are under pressure to control pharmaceutical expenditures without adversely affecting quality of care. Financial incentives seeking to influence prescribers' behaviour include budgetary arrangements at primary care and hospital settings (pharmaceutical budget caps or targets), financial rewards for target behaviours or outcomes (pay for performance interventions) and reduced benefit margin for prescribers based on medicine sales and prescriptions (pharmaceutical reimbursement rate reduction policies). This is the first update of the original version of this review.
OBJECTIVES:
To determine the effects of pharmaceutical policies using financial incentives to influence prescribers' practices on drug use, healthcare utilisation, health outcomes and costs (expenditures).
SEARCH METHODS:
We searched the Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials (CENTRAL) (searched 29/01/2015); MEDLINE, Ovid SP (searched 29/01/2015); EMBASE, Ovid SP (searched 29/01/2015); International Network for Rational Use of Drugs (INRUD) Bibliography (searched 29/01/2015); National Health Service (NHS) Economic Evaluation Database (searched 29/01/2015); EconLit - ProQuest (searched 02/02/2015); and Science Citation Index and Social Sciences Citation Index, Institute for Scientific Information (ISI) Web of Knowledge (citation search for included studies searched 10/02/2015). We screened the reference lists of relevant reports and contacted study authors and organisations to identify additional studies.
SELECTION CRITERIA:
We included policies that intend to affect prescribing by means of financial incentives for prescribers. Included in this category are pharmaceutical budget caps or targets, pay for performance and drug reimbursement rate reductions and other financial policies, if they were specifically targeted at prescribing or drug utilisation. Policies in this review were defined as laws, rules, regulations and financial and administrative orders made or implemented by payers such as national or local governments, non-government organisations, private or social insurers and insurance-like organisations. One of the following outcomes had to be reported: drug use, healthcare utilisation, health outcomes or costs. The study had to be a randomised or non-randomised trial, an interrupted time series (ITS) analysis, a repeated measures study or a controlled before-after (CBA) study.
DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS:
At least two review authors independently assessed eligibility for inclusion of studies and risks of bias using Cochrane Effective Practice and Organisation of Care (EPOC) criteria and extracted data from the included studies. For CBA studies, we reported relative effects (e.g. adjusted relative change). The review team re-analysed all ITS results. When possible, the review team also re-analysed CBA data as ITS data.
MAIN RESULTS:
Eighteen evaluations (six new studies) of pharmaceutical policies from six high-income countries met our inclusion criteria. Fourteen studies evaluated pharmaceutical budget policies in the UK (nine studies), two in Germany and Ireland and one each in Sweden and Taiwan. Three studies assessed pay for performance policies in the UK (two) and the Netherlands (one). One study from Taiwan assessed a reimbursement rate reduction policy. ITS analyses had some limitations. All CBA studies had serious limitations. No study from low-income or middle-income countries met the inclusion criteria.Pharmaceutical budgets may lead to a modest reduction in drug use (median relative change -2.8%; low-certainty evidence). We are uncertain of the effects of the policy on drug costs or healthcare utilisation, as the certainty of such evidence has been assessed as very low. Effects of this policy on health outcomes were not reported. Effects of pay for performance policies on drug use and health outcomes are uncertain, as the certainty of such evidence has been assessed as very low. Effects of this policy on drug costs and healthcare utilisation have not been measured. Effects of the reimbursement rate reduction policy on drug use and drug costs are uncertain, as the certainty of such evidence has been assessed as very low. No included study assessed the effects of this policy on healthcare utilisation or health outcomes. Administration costs of the policies were not reported in any of the included studies.
AUTHORS' CONCLUSIONS:
Although financial incentives are considered an important element in strategies to change prescribing patterns, limited evidence of their effects can be found. Effects of policies, including pay for performance policies, in improving quality of care and health outcomes remain uncertain. Because pharmaceutical policies have uncertain effects, and because they might cause harm as well as benefit, proper evaluation of these policies is needed. Future studies should consider the impact of these policies on health outcomes, drug use and overall healthcare expenditures, as well as on drug expenditures.
