BACKGROUND: Growing expenditures on prescription medicines represent a major challenge to many health systems. Cap and co-payment policies are intended as an incentive to deter unnecessary or marginal utilisation, and to reduce third-party payer expenditures by shifting parts of the financial burden from insurers to patients, thus increasing their financial responsibility for prescription medicines. Direct patient payment policies include caps (maximum numbers of prescriptions or medicines that are reimbursed), fixed co-payments (patients pay a fixed amount per prescription or medicine), co-insurance (patients pay a percentage of the price), ceilings (patients pay the full price or part of the cost up to a ceiling, after which medicines are free or are available at reduced cost) and tier co-payments (differential co-payments usually assigned to generic and brand medicines). This is the first update of the original review.
OBJECTIVES: To determine the effects of cap and co-payment (cost-sharing) policies on use of medicines, healthcare utilisation, health outcomes and costs (expenditures).
SEARCH METHODS: For this update, we searched the following databases and websites: The Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials (CENTRAL) (including the Cochrane Effective Practice and Organisation of Care (EPOC) Group Specialised Register, Cochrane Library; MEDLINE, Ovid; EMBASE, Ovid; IPSA, EBSCO; EconLit, ProQuest; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts, ProQuest; PAIS International, ProQuest; INRUD Bibliography; WHOLIS, WHO; LILACS), VHL; Global Health Library WHO; PubMed, NHL; SCOPUS; SciELO, BIREME; OpenGrey; JOLIS Library Network; OECD Library; World Bank e-Library; World Health Organization, WHO; World Bank Documents & Reports; International Clinical Trials Registry Platform (ICTRP), WHO; ClinicalTrials.gov, NIH. We searched all databases during January and February 2013, apart from SciELO, which we searched in January 2012, and ICTRP and ClinicalTrials.gov, which we searched in March 2014.
SELECTION CRITERIA: We defined policies in this review as laws, rules or financial or administrative orders made by governments, non-government organisations or private insurers. We included randomised controlled trials, non-randomised controlled trials, interrupted time series studies, repeated measures studies and controlled before-after studies of cap or co-payment policies for a large jurisdiction or system of care. To be included, a study had to include an objective measure of at least one of the following outcomes: medicine use, healthcare utilisation, health outcomes or costs (expenditures).
DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS: Two review authors independently extracted data and assessed study limitations. We reanalysed time series data for studies with sufficient data, if appropriate analyses were not reported.
MAIN RESULTS: We included 32 full-text articles (17 new) reporting evaluations of 39 different interventions (one study - Newhouse 1993 - comprises five papers). We excluded from this update eight controlled before-after studies included in the previous version of this review, because they included only one site in their intervention or control groups. Five papers evaluated caps, and six evaluated a cap with co-insurance and a ceiling. Six evaluated fixed co-payment, two evaluated tiered fixed co-payment, 10 evaluated a ceiling with fixed co-payment and 10 evaluated a ceiling with co-insurance. Only one evaluation was a randomised trial. The certainty of the evidence was found to be generally low to very low.Increasing the amount of money that people pay for medicines may reduce insurers' medicine expenditures and may reduce patients' medicine use. This may include reductions in the use of life-sustaining medicines as well as medicines that are important in treating chronic conditions and medicines for asymptomatic conditions. These types of interventions may lead to small decreases in or uncertain effects on healthcare utilisation. We found no studies that reliably reported the effects of these types of interventions on health outcomes.
AUTHORS' CONCLUSIONS: The diversity of interventions and outcomes addressed across studies and differences in settings, populations and comparisons made it difficult to summarise results across studies. Cap and co-payment polices may reduce the use of medicines and reduce medicine expenditures for health insurers. However, they may also reduce the use of life-sustaining medicines or medicines that are important in treating chronic, including symptomatic, conditions and, consequently, could increase the use of healthcare services. Fixed co-payment with a ceiling and tiered fixed co-payment may be less likely to reduce the use of essential medicines or to increase the use of healthcare services.
BACKGROUND: The proportion of total healthcare expenditures spent on drugs has continued to grow in countries of all income categories. Policy-makers are under pressure to control pharmaceutical expenditures without adversely affecting quality of care. Financial incentives seeking to influence prescribers' behaviour include budgetary arrangements at primary care and hospital settings (pharmaceutical budget caps or targets), financial rewards for target behaviours or outcomes (pay for performance interventions) and reduced benefit margin for prescribers based on medicine sales and prescriptions (pharmaceutical reimbursement rate reduction policies). This is the first update of the original version of this review.
OBJECTIVES: To determine the effects of pharmaceutical policies using financial incentives to influence prescribers' practices on drug use, healthcare utilisation, health outcomes and costs (expenditures).
SEARCH METHODS: We searched the Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials (CENTRAL) (searched 29/01/2015); MEDLINE, Ovid SP (searched 29/01/2015); EMBASE, Ovid SP (searched 29/01/2015); International Network for Rational Use of Drugs (INRUD) Bibliography (searched 29/01/2015); National Health Service (NHS) Economic Evaluation Database (searched 29/01/2015); EconLit - ProQuest (searched 02/02/2015); and Science Citation Index and Social Sciences Citation Index, Institute for Scientific Information (ISI) Web of Knowledge (citation search for included studies searched 10/02/2015). We screened the reference lists of relevant reports and contacted study authors and organisations to identify additional studies.
SELECTION CRITERIA: We included policies that intend to affect prescribing by means of financial incentives for prescribers. Included in this category are pharmaceutical budget caps or targets, pay for performance and drug reimbursement rate reductions and other financial policies, if they were specifically targeted at prescribing or drug utilisation. Policies in this review were defined as laws, rules, regulations and financial and administrative orders made or implemented by payers such as national or local governments, non-government organisations, private or social insurers and insurance-like organisations. One of the following outcomes had to be reported: drug use, healthcare utilisation, health outcomes or costs. The study had to be a randomised or non-randomised trial, an interrupted time series (ITS) analysis, a repeated measures study or a controlled before-after (CBA) study.
DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS: At least two review authors independently assessed eligibility for inclusion of studies and risks of bias using Cochrane Effective Practice and Organisation of Care (EPOC) criteria and extracted data from the included studies. For CBA studies, we reported relative effects (e.g. adjusted relative change). The review team re-analysed all ITS results. When possible, the review team also re-analysed CBA data as ITS data.
MAIN RESULTS: Eighteen evaluations (six new studies) of pharmaceutical policies from six high-income countries met our inclusion criteria. Fourteen studies evaluated pharmaceutical budget policies in the UK (nine studies), two in Germany and Ireland and one each in Sweden and Taiwan. Three studies assessed pay for performance policies in the UK (two) and the Netherlands (one). One study from Taiwan assessed a reimbursement rate reduction policy. ITS analyses had some limitations. All CBA studies had serious limitations. No study from low-income or middle-income countries met the inclusion criteria.Pharmaceutical budgets may lead to a modest reduction in drug use (median relative change -2.8%; low-certainty evidence). We are uncertain of the effects of the policy on drug costs or healthcare utilisation, as the certainty of such evidence has been assessed as very low. Effects of this policy on health outcomes were not reported. Effects of pay for performance policies on drug use and health outcomes are uncertain, as the certainty of such evidence has been assessed as very low. Effects of this policy on drug costs and healthcare utilisation have not been measured. Effects of the reimbursement rate reduction policy on drug use and drug costs are uncertain, as the certainty of such evidence has been assessed as very low. No included study assessed the effects of this policy on healthcare utilisation or health outcomes. Administration costs of the policies were not reported in any of the included studies.
AUTHORS' CONCLUSIONS: Although financial incentives are considered an important element in strategies to change prescribing patterns, limited evidence of their effects can be found. Effects of policies, including pay for performance policies, in improving quality of care and health outcomes remain uncertain. Because pharmaceutical policies have uncertain effects, and because they might cause harm as well as benefit, proper evaluation of these policies is needed. Future studies should consider the impact of these policies on health outcomes, drug use and overall healthcare expenditures, as well as on drug expenditures.
BACKGROUND: Pharmaceuticals are important interventions that could improve people's health. Pharmaceutical pricing and purchasing policies are used as cost-containment measures to determine or affect the prices that are paid for drugs. Internal reference pricing establishes a benchmark or reference price within a country which is the maximum level of reimbursement for a group of drugs. Other policies include price controls, maximum prices, index pricing, price negotiations and volume-based pricing.
OBJECTIVES: To determine the effects of pharmaceutical pricing and purchasing policies on health outcomes, healthcare utilisation, drug expenditures and drug use.
SEARCH METHODS: We searched the Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials (CENTRAL), part of The Cochrane Library (including the Effective Practice and Organisation of Care Group Register) (searched 22/10/2012); MEDLINE In-Process & Other Non-Indexed Citations and MEDLINE, Ovid (searched 22/10/2012); EconLit, ProQuest (searched 22/10/2012); PAIS International, ProQuest (searched 22/10/2012); World Wide Political Science Abstracts, ProQuest (searched 22/10/2012); INRUD Bibliography (searched 22/10/2012); Embase, Ovid (searched 14/12/2010); NHSEED, part of The Cochrane Library (searched 08/12/2010); LILACS, VHL (searched 14/12/2010); International Political Science Abstracts (IPSA), Ebsco (searched (17/12/2010); OpenSIGLE (searched 21/12/10); WHOLIS, WHO (searched 17/12/2010); World Bank (Documents and Reports) (searched 21/12/2010); Jolis (searched 09/10/2011); Global Jolis (searched 09/10/2011) ; OECD (searched 30/08/2005); OECD iLibrary (searched 30/08/2005); World Bank eLibrary (searched 21/12/2010); WHO - The Essential Drugs and Medicines web site (browsed 21/12/2010).
SELECTION CRITERIA: Policies in this review were defined as laws; rules; financial and administrative orders made by governments, non-government organisations or private insurers. To be included a study had to include an objective measure of at least one of the following outcomes: drug use, healthcare utilisation and health outcomes or costs (expenditures); the study had to be a randomised trial, non-randomised trial, interrupted time series (ITS), repeated measures (RM) study or a controlled before-after study of a pharmaceutical pricing or purchasing policy for a large jurisdiction or system of care.
DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS: Two review authors independently extracted data and assessed the risk of bias. Results were summarised in tables. There were too few comparisons with similar outcomes across studies to allow for meta-analysis or meaningful exploration of heterogeneity.
MAIN RESULTS: We included 18 studies (seven identified in the update): 17 of reference pricing, one of which also assessed maximum prices, and one of index pricing. None of the studies were trials. All included studies used ITS or RM analyses. The quality of the evidence was low or very low for all outcomes. Three reference pricing studies reported cumulative drug expenditures at one year after the transition period. Two studies reported the median relative insurer's cumulative expenditures, on both reference drugs and cost share drugs, of -18%, ranging from -36% to 3%. The third study reported relative insurer's cumulative expenditures on total market of -1.5%. Four reference pricing studies reported median relative insurer's expenditures on both reference drugs and cost share drugs of -10%, ranging from -53% to 4% at one year after the transition period. Four reference pricing studies reported a median relative change of 15% in reference drugs prescriptions at one year (range -14% to 166%). Three reference pricing studies reported a median relative change of -39% in cost share drugs prescriptions at one year (range -87% to -17%). One study of index pricing reported a relative change of 55% (95% CI 11% to 98%) in the use of generic drugs and -43% relative change (95% CI -67% to -18%) in brand drugs at six months after the transition period. The same study reported a price change of -5.3% and -1.1% for generic and brand drugs respectively six months after the start of the policy. One study of maximum prices reported a relative change in monthly sales volume of all statins of 21% (95% CI 19% to 24%) after one year of the introduction of this policy. Four studies reported effects on mortality and healthcare utilisation, however they were excluded because of study design limitations.
AUTHORS' CONCLUSIONS: The majority of the studies of pricing and purchasing policies that met our inclusion criteria evaluated reference pricing. We found that internal reference pricing may reduce expenditures in the short term by shifting drug use from cost share drugs to reference drugs. Reference pricing may reduce related expenditures with effects on reference drugs but the effect on expenditures of cost share drugs is uncertain. Reference pricing may increase the use of reference drugs and may reduce the use of cost share drugs. The analysis and reporting of the effects on patients' drug expenditures were limited in the included studies and administration costs were not reported. Reference pricing effects on health are uncertain due to lack of evidence. The effects of other purchasing and pricing policies are until now uncertain due to sparse evidence. However, index pricing may reduce the use of brand drugs, increase the use of generic drugs, and may also slightly reduce the price of the generic drug when compared with no intervention.
Given rising pharmaceutical expenditures and the widespread use of reference pricing as a costcontainment instrument abroad, we systematically reviewed the evidence evaluating reference pricing policies. We performed a structured electronic search of peer-reviewed journals for studies published before that reported on the effects of reference pricing policies on medication use, payer and patient spending, and resource consumption. Our search yielded 16 studies describing 9 reference-pricing policies from 6 countries. Reference-pricing policies led to decreases in drug prices and increases in utilization of targeted medications, while also reducing payer and patient expenditures. In addition, these policies did not lead to increased use of medical services, such as physician office visits and hospitalization. These results suggest that reference pricing may be an attractive policy strategy for the US healthcare system.
BACKGROUND: Public policy makers and benefit plan managers need to restrain rising pharmaceutical drug costs while preserving access and optimizing health benefits. OBJECTIVES: To determine the effects of a pharmaceutical policy restricting the reimbursement of selected medications on drug use, health care utilization, health outcomes and costs (expenditures). SEARCH STRATEGY: We searched the 14 major bibliographic databases and websites (to January 2009). SELECTION CRITERIA: Included were studies of pharmaceutical policies that restrict coverage and reimbursement of selected drugs or drug classes, often using additional patient specific information related to health status or need. We included randomised controlled trials, non-randomised controlled trials, interrupted time series (ITS) analyses, repeated measures studies and controlled before-after studies set in large care systems or jurisdictions. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS: Two authors independently extracted data and assessed study limitations. Quantitative re-analysis of time series data was undertaken for studies with sufficient data. MAIN RESULTS: We included 29 ITS analyses (12 were controlled) investigating policies targeting 11 drug classes for restriction. Participants were most often senior citizens or low income adult populations, or both, in publically subsidized or administered pharmaceutical benefit plans. Impact of policies varied by drug class and whether restrictions were implemented or relaxed. When policies targeted gastric-acid suppressant and non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drug classes, decreased drug use and substantial savings on drugs occurred immediately and for up to two years afterwards, with no increase in the use of other health services (6 studies). Targeting second generation antipsychotic drugs increased treatment discontinuity and the use of other health services without reducing overall drug expenditures (2 studies). Relaxing restrictions for reimbursement of antihypertensives and statins increased appropriate use and decreased overall drug expenditures. Two studies which measured health outcomes directly were inconclusive. AUTHORS' CONCLUSIONS: Implementing restrictions to coverage and reimbursement of selected medications can decrease third-party drug spending without increasing the use of other health services (6 studies). Relaxing reimbursement rules for drugs used for secondary prevention can also remove barriers to access. Policy design, however, needs to be based on research quantifying the harm and benefit profiles of target and alternative drugs to avoid unwanted health system and health effects. Health impact evaluation should be conducted where drugs are not interchangeable. Impacts on health equity, relating to the fair and just distribution of health benefits in society (sustainable access to publically financed drug benefits for seniors and low income populations, for example), also require explicit measurement.
BACKGROUND: Direct to consumer advertising is increasingly used by the pharmaceutical industry, but its benefits and harms have yet to be summarised in a comprehensive and rigorous manner.
METHODS: A systematic review was conducted of robust evaluations of the impact (positive and negative) of direct to consumer advertising. A broad range of databases and data sources (including Cinahl, Embase, HMIC, HSRProj, Medline, PsycInfo, and the internet) were searched from inception to 2004.
RESULTS: From 2853 citations only four reports were found that met the strict inclusion criteria and provided usable results. Direct to consumer advertising is associated with increased prescription of advertised products and there is substantial impact on patients' request for specific drugs and physicians' confidence in prescribing. No additional benefits in terms of health outcomes were demonstrated.
DISCUSSION: Direct to consumer advertising is banned in most countries, and the research evidence tends to support the negative impact that is feared by those who support a legislative ban. Further research is needed into the clinical and economic impact of direct to consumer advertising in healthcare systems.
Rising pharmaceutical expenditures have led to the use of cost-sharing measures. The authors undertook a systematic review of the effects of cost sharing on vulnerable populations (the poor and those with chronic illnesses). Virtually every article reviewed supports the view that cost sharing decreases the use of prescription drugs in these populations. Copayments or a cap on the monthly number of subsidized prescriptions lower drug costs for the payer, but any savings may be offset by increases in other health care areas. Cost sharing also leads to patients foregoing essential medications and to a decline in health care status.
OBJECTIVE: To review the effectiveness of strategies to improve the quality and efficiency of medication use in managed care organizations (MCOs).
STUDY DESIGN: Systematic review of published intervention studies.
METHODS: Studies were identified by using computerized and manual literature searches and personal contacts, and were categorized by intervention type and adequacy of research design according to commonly accepted criteria. Reported significance and magnitude of the changes in key outcomes were used to summarize the effects of studies with adequate research designs.
RESULTS: The searches identified 105 studies, 70 of which were reported since 1996. Overall, 46% of the studies met the minimum criteria for methodologic adequacy (n = 48). Consistently effective interventions included dissemination of educational materials with drug samples, participatory clinical guideline development, group or one-to-one educational outreach, and enhanced patient-specific feedback. Disease management (primarily for depression and diabetes) showed promise in improving short-term outcomes. Dissemination of educational materials and aggregated feedback alone were ineffective. Interventions in staff-model health maintenance organizations were more effective than those conducted in group-model health maintenance organizations.
CONCLUSION: High-quality studies of interventions to improve drug use in MCOs are increasing in frequency. There is evidence for the effectiveness of several strategies to change drug use, but little is known about longer-term clinical outcomes. Few well-designed, published studies have assessed the efficacy or safety of financial incentives for physicians, tiered copayments for patients, or formularies--despite their widespread use.
OBJECTIVE: To determine the consequences of restrictive formularies in the ambulatory care setting in 4 areas: overall drug expenditures, overall healthcare spending, changes in the quality of prescribing, and health outcomes.
STUDY DESIGN: A MEDLINE search was conducted for English and French language articles, published between 1977-1999, that presented results in quantitative terms. Only articles from industrialized countries were used.
METHODS: Information was extracted from each article in the following areas: time period of the study, geographic location and group of patients involved, outcome measurement(s), intervention, study design, and results.
RESULTS: Poor methodologic quality made definitive conclusions difficult to draw in most areas. Prior authorization may be effective in controlling drug costs without increasing costs in other areas. Both desirable and undesirable therapeutic substitutions may take place when drugs are delisted from formularies.
CONCLUSIONS: The use of restrictive formularies in the ambulatory care setting requires more rigorous research. Before changes are made in formularies, money needs to be set aside for research into short-term and long-term consequences of using restrictive formularies.
Background: It is widely believed that the method of payment of physicians may affect their clinical behaviour. Although payment systems may be used to achieve policy objectives (e.g. cost containment or improved quality of care), little is known about the effects of different payment systems in achieving these objectives. Objectives: To evaluate the impact of different methods of payment (capitation, salary, fee for service and mixed systems of payment) on the clinical behaviour of primary care physicians (PCPs). Search methods: We searched the Cochrane Effective Practice and Organisation of Care Group specialised register; the Cochrane Controlled Trials Register; MEDLINE (1966 to October 1997); BIDS EMBASE (1980 to October 1997); BIDS ISI (1981 to October 1997); EconLit (1969 to October 1997); HealthStar (1975 to October 1997) Helmis (1984 to October 1997); health economics discussion paper series of the Universities of York, Aberdeen, Sheffield, Bristol, Brunel, and McMaster; Swedish Institute of Health Economics; RAND corporation; and reference lists of articles. Selection criteria: Randomised trials, controlled before and after studies and interrupted time series analyses of interventions comparing the impact of capitation, salary, fee for service (FFS) and mixed systems of payment on primary care physician satisfaction with working environment; cost and quantity of care; type and pattern of care; equity of care; and patient health status and satisfaction. Data collection and analysis: Two reviewers independently extracted data and assessed study quality. Main results: Four studies were included involving 640 primary care physicians and more than 6400 patients. There was considerable variation in study setting and the range of outcomes measured. FFS resulted in more primary care visits/contacts, visits to specialists and diagnostic and curative services but fewer hospital referrals and repeat prescriptions compared with capitation. Compliance with a recommended number of visits was higher under FFS compared with capitation payment. FFS resulted in more patient visits, greater continuity of care, higher compliance with a recommended number of visits, but patients were less satisfied with access to their physician compared with salaried payment. Authors' conclusions: It is noteworthy that so few studies met the inclusion criteria. There is some evidence to suggest that the method of payment of primary care physicians affects their behaviour, but the findings' generalisability is unknown. More evaluations of the effect of payment systems on PCP behaviour are needed, especially in terms of the relative impact of salary versus capitation payments.
Growing expenditures on prescription medicines represent a major challenge to many health systems. Cap and co-payment policies are intended as an incentive to deter unnecessary or marginal utilisation, and to reduce third-party payer expenditures by shifting parts of the financial burden from insurers to patients, thus increasing their financial responsibility for prescription medicines. Direct patient payment policies include caps (maximum numbers of prescriptions or medicines that are reimbursed), fixed co-payments (patients pay a fixed amount per prescription or medicine), co-insurance (patients pay a percentage of the price), ceilings (patients pay the full price or part of the cost up to a ceiling, after which medicines are free or are available at reduced cost) and tier co-payments (differential co-payments usually assigned to generic and brand medicines). This is the first update of the original review.
OBJECTIVES:
To determine the effects of cap and co-payment (cost-sharing) policies on use of medicines, healthcare utilisation, health outcomes and costs (expenditures).
SEARCH METHODS:
For this update, we searched the following databases and websites: The Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials (CENTRAL) (including the Cochrane Effective Practice and Organisation of Care (EPOC) Group Specialised Register, Cochrane Library; MEDLINE, Ovid; EMBASE, Ovid; IPSA, EBSCO; EconLit, ProQuest; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts, ProQuest; PAIS International, ProQuest; INRUD Bibliography; WHOLIS, WHO; LILACS), VHL; Global Health Library WHO; PubMed, NHL; SCOPUS; SciELO, BIREME; OpenGrey; JOLIS Library Network; OECD Library; World Bank e-Library; World Health Organization, WHO; World Bank Documents & Reports; International Clinical Trials Registry Platform (ICTRP), WHO; ClinicalTrials.gov, NIH. We searched all databases during January and February 2013, apart from SciELO, which we searched in January 2012, and ICTRP and ClinicalTrials.gov, which we searched in March 2014.
SELECTION CRITERIA:
We defined policies in this review as laws, rules or financial or administrative orders made by governments, non-government organisations or private insurers. We included randomised controlled trials, non-randomised controlled trials, interrupted time series studies, repeated measures studies and controlled before-after studies of cap or co-payment policies for a large jurisdiction or system of care. To be included, a study had to include an objective measure of at least one of the following outcomes: medicine use, healthcare utilisation, health outcomes or costs (expenditures).
DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS:
Two review authors independently extracted data and assessed study limitations. We reanalysed time series data for studies with sufficient data, if appropriate analyses were not reported.
MAIN RESULTS:
We included 32 full-text articles (17 new) reporting evaluations of 39 different interventions (one study - Newhouse 1993 - comprises five papers). We excluded from this update eight controlled before-after studies included in the previous version of this review, because they included only one site in their intervention or control groups. Five papers evaluated caps, and six evaluated a cap with co-insurance and a ceiling. Six evaluated fixed co-payment, two evaluated tiered fixed co-payment, 10 evaluated a ceiling with fixed co-payment and 10 evaluated a ceiling with co-insurance. Only one evaluation was a randomised trial. The certainty of the evidence was found to be generally low to very low.Increasing the amount of money that people pay for medicines may reduce insurers' medicine expenditures and may reduce patients' medicine use. This may include reductions in the use of life-sustaining medicines as well as medicines that are important in treating chronic conditions and medicines for asymptomatic conditions. These types of interventions may lead to small decreases in or uncertain effects on healthcare utilisation. We found no studies that reliably reported the effects of these types of interventions on health outcomes.
AUTHORS' CONCLUSIONS:
The diversity of interventions and outcomes addressed across studies and differences in settings, populations and comparisons made it difficult to summarise results across studies. Cap and co-payment polices may reduce the use of medicines and reduce medicine expenditures for health insurers. However, they may also reduce the use of life-sustaining medicines or medicines that are important in treating chronic, including symptomatic, conditions and, consequently, could increase the use of healthcare services. Fixed co-payment with a ceiling and tiered fixed co-payment may be less likely to reduce the use of essential medicines or to increase the use of healthcare services.
Systematic Review Question»Systematic review of interventions
