BACKGROUND: Contracting out of governmental health services is a financing strategy that governs the way in which public sector funds are used to have services delivered by non-governmental health service providers (NGPs). It represents a contract between the government and an NGP, detailing the mechanisms and conditions by which the latter should provide health care on behalf of the government. Contracting out is intended to improve the delivery and use of healthcare services. This Review updates a Cochrane Review first published in 2009.
OBJECTIVES: To assess effects of contracting out governmental clinical health services to non-governmental service provider/s, on (i) utilisation of clinical health services; (ii) improvement in population health outcomes; (iii) improvement in equity of utilisation of these services; (iv) costs and cost-effectiveness of delivering the services; and (v) improvement in health systems performance.
SEARCH METHODS: We searched CENTRAL, MEDLINE, Embase, NHS Economic Evaluation Database, EconLit, ProQuest, and Global Health on 07 April 2017, along with two trials registers - ClinicalTrials.gov and the International Clinical Trials Registry Platform - on 17 November 2017.
SELECTION CRITERIA: Individually randomised and cluster-randomised trials, controlled before-after studies, interrupted time series, and repeated measures studies, comparing government-delivered clinical health services versus those contracted out to NGPs, or comparing different models of non-governmental-delivered clinical health services.
DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS: Two authors independently screened all records, extracted data from the included studies and assessed the risk of bias. We calculated the net effect for all outcomes. A positive value favours the intervention whilst a negative value favours the control. Effect estimates are presented with 95% confidence intervals. We used the Grading of Recommendations Assessment, Development and Evaluation (GRADE) approach to assess the certainty of the evidence and we prepared a Summary of Findings table.
MAIN RESULTS: We included two studies, a cluster-randomised trial conducted in Cambodia, and a controlled before-after study conducted in Guatemala. Both studies reported that contracting out over 12 months probably makes little or no difference in (i) immunisation uptake of children 12 to 24 months old (moderate-certainty evidence), (ii) the number of women who had more than two antenatal care visits (moderate-certainty evidence), and (iii) female use of contraceptives (moderate-certainty evidence).The Cambodia trial reported that contracting out may make little or no difference in the mortality over 12 months of children younger than one year of age (net effect = -4.3%, intervention effect P = 0.36, clustered standard error (SE) = 3.0%; low-certainty evidence), nor to the incidence of childhood diarrhoea (net effect = -16.2%, intervention effect P = 0.07, clustered SE = 19.0%; low-certainty evidence). The Cambodia study found that contracting out probably reduces individual out-of-pocket spending over 12 months on curative care (net effect = $ -19.25 (2003 USD), intervention effect P = 0.01, clustered SE = $ 5.12; moderate-certainty evidence). The included studies did not report equity in the use of clinical health services and in adverse effects.
AUTHORS' CONCLUSIONS: This update confirms the findings of the original review. Contracting out probably reduces individual out-of-pocket spending on curative care (moderate-certainty evidence), but probably makes little or no difference in other health utilisation or service delivery outcomes (moderate- to low-certainty evidence). Therefore, contracting out programmes may be no better or worse than government-provided services, although additional rigorously designed studies may change this result. The literature provides many examples of contracting out programmes, which implies that this is a feasible response when governments fail to provide good clinical health care. Future contracting out programmes should be framed within a rigorous study design to allow valid and reliable measures of their effects. Such studies should include qualitative research that assesses the views of programme implementers and beneficiaries, and records implementation mechanisms. This approach may reveal enablers for, and barriers to, successful implementation of such programmes.
BACKGROUND: The proportion of total healthcare expenditures spent on drugs has continued to grow in countries of all income categories. Policy-makers are under pressure to control pharmaceutical expenditures without adversely affecting quality of care. Financial incentives seeking to influence prescribers' behaviour include budgetary arrangements at primary care and hospital settings (pharmaceutical budget caps or targets), financial rewards for target behaviours or outcomes (pay for performance interventions) and reduced benefit margin for prescribers based on medicine sales and prescriptions (pharmaceutical reimbursement rate reduction policies). This is the first update of the original version of this review.
OBJECTIVES: To determine the effects of pharmaceutical policies using financial incentives to influence prescribers' practices on drug use, healthcare utilisation, health outcomes and costs (expenditures).
SEARCH METHODS: We searched the Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials (CENTRAL) (searched 29/01/2015); MEDLINE, Ovid SP (searched 29/01/2015); EMBASE, Ovid SP (searched 29/01/2015); International Network for Rational Use of Drugs (INRUD) Bibliography (searched 29/01/2015); National Health Service (NHS) Economic Evaluation Database (searched 29/01/2015); EconLit - ProQuest (searched 02/02/2015); and Science Citation Index and Social Sciences Citation Index, Institute for Scientific Information (ISI) Web of Knowledge (citation search for included studies searched 10/02/2015). We screened the reference lists of relevant reports and contacted study authors and organisations to identify additional studies.
SELECTION CRITERIA: We included policies that intend to affect prescribing by means of financial incentives for prescribers. Included in this category are pharmaceutical budget caps or targets, pay for performance and drug reimbursement rate reductions and other financial policies, if they were specifically targeted at prescribing or drug utilisation. Policies in this review were defined as laws, rules, regulations and financial and administrative orders made or implemented by payers such as national or local governments, non-government organisations, private or social insurers and insurance-like organisations. One of the following outcomes had to be reported: drug use, healthcare utilisation, health outcomes or costs. The study had to be a randomised or non-randomised trial, an interrupted time series (ITS) analysis, a repeated measures study or a controlled before-after (CBA) study.
DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS: At least two review authors independently assessed eligibility for inclusion of studies and risks of bias using Cochrane Effective Practice and Organisation of Care (EPOC) criteria and extracted data from the included studies. For CBA studies, we reported relative effects (e.g. adjusted relative change). The review team re-analysed all ITS results. When possible, the review team also re-analysed CBA data as ITS data.
MAIN RESULTS: Eighteen evaluations (six new studies) of pharmaceutical policies from six high-income countries met our inclusion criteria. Fourteen studies evaluated pharmaceutical budget policies in the UK (nine studies), two in Germany and Ireland and one each in Sweden and Taiwan. Three studies assessed pay for performance policies in the UK (two) and the Netherlands (one). One study from Taiwan assessed a reimbursement rate reduction policy. ITS analyses had some limitations. All CBA studies had serious limitations. No study from low-income or middle-income countries met the inclusion criteria.Pharmaceutical budgets may lead to a modest reduction in drug use (median relative change -2.8%; low-certainty evidence). We are uncertain of the effects of the policy on drug costs or healthcare utilisation, as the certainty of such evidence has been assessed as very low. Effects of this policy on health outcomes were not reported. Effects of pay for performance policies on drug use and health outcomes are uncertain, as the certainty of such evidence has been assessed as very low. Effects of this policy on drug costs and healthcare utilisation have not been measured. Effects of the reimbursement rate reduction policy on drug use and drug costs are uncertain, as the certainty of such evidence has been assessed as very low. No included study assessed the effects of this policy on healthcare utilisation or health outcomes. Administration costs of the policies were not reported in any of the included studies.
AUTHORS' CONCLUSIONS: Although financial incentives are considered an important element in strategies to change prescribing patterns, limited evidence of their effects can be found. Effects of policies, including pay for performance policies, in improving quality of care and health outcomes remain uncertain. Because pharmaceutical policies have uncertain effects, and because they might cause harm as well as benefit, proper evaluation of these policies is needed. Future studies should consider the impact of these policies on health outcomes, drug use and overall healthcare expenditures, as well as on drug expenditures.
Pay-for-performance and public reporting programs may have a neutral, narrowing, or widening effect on racial disparities in health care. The authors begin this article by suggesting that certain characteristics of these programs may affect disparities. They then present results from a systematic review of the literature on the effects of performance incentive programs on racial disparities in health care. The review revealed that only one empirical study provided data on this issue: It showed that a major public reporting program increased disparities in coronary artery bypass graft rates. The authors then present the results of interviews with leaders of 15 major performance incentive programs in the United States. The interviews indicated that current programs are not designed to reduce disparities and often lack characteristics that may be important in reducing disparities. The article concludes with program leaders' recommendations on how performance incentive programs could be designed to reduce disparities.
CONTEXT: Cash transfers conditional on certain behaviors, intended to provide access to social services, have been introduced in several developing countries. The effectiveness of these strategies in different contexts has not previously been the subject of a systematic review. OBJECTIVE: To assess the effectiveness of conditional monetary transfers in improving access to and use of health services, as well as improving health outcomes, in low- and middle-income countries. DATA SOURCES: Relevant publications were identified via electronic medical and social science databases from inception to April 2006 (PubMED, EMBASE, POPLINE, CAB Direct, Healthcare Management Information Consortium, WHOLIS (World Health Organization Library Database), African Healthline, International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS), Eldis, British Library for Development Studies (BLDS), ID21, Journal Storage (Jstor), Inter-Science, ScienceDirect, Internet Documents in Economics Access Service (Research Papers in Economics) (IDEAS[Repec]), Latin American and Caribbean Health Sciences Literature (LILACS), MEDCARIB, Virtual Library in Health (ADOLEC), Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), FRANCIS, The Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials, the Database of Abstracts of Reviews of Effectiveness, and the Effective Practice and Organization of Care Group (EPOC) Register. Reference lists of relevant papers and "gray" literature resources were also searched. STUDY SELECTION: To be included, a paper had to meet study design criteria (randomized controlled trial, interrupted time series analysis, and controlled before and after study) and include a measure of at least 1 of the following outcomes: health care utilization, health expenditure, or health outcomes. Twenty-eight papers were retrieved for assessment and 10 were included in this review. DATA EXTRACTION: Methodological details and outcomes were extracted by 2 reviewers who independently assessed the quality of the papers. RESULTS: Overall, the evidence suggests that conditional cash transfer programs are effective in increasing the use of preventive services and sometimes improving health status. CONCLUSIONS: Further research is needed to clarify the cost effectiveness of conditional cash transfer programs and better understand which components play a critical role. The potential success and desirability of such programs in low-income settings, with more limited health system capacity, also deserves more investigation.
BACKGROUND: Most physicians and hospitals are paid the same regardless of the quality of the health care they provide. This produces no financial incentives and, in some cases, produces disincentives for quality. Increasing numbers of programs link payment to performance. PURPOSE: To systematically review studies assessing the effect of explicit financial incentives for improved performance on measures of health care quality. DATA SOURCES: PubMed search of English-language literature (1 January 1980 to 14 November 2005), and reference lists of retrieved articles. STUDY SELECTION: Empirical studies of the relationship between explicit financial incentives designed to improve health care quality and a quantitative measure of health care quality. DATA EXTRACTION: The authors categorized studies according to the level of the incentive (individual physician, provider group, or health care payment system) and the type of quality measure rewarded. DATA SYNTHESIS: Thirteen of 17 studies examined process-of-care quality measures, most of which were for preventive services. Five of the 6 studies of physician-level financial incentives and 7 of the 9 studies of provider group-level financial incentives found partial or positive effects on measures of quality. One of the 2 studies of incentives at the payment-system level found a positive effect on access to care, and 1 showed evidence of a negative effect on access to care for the sickest patients. In all, 4 studies suggested unintended effects of incentives. The authors found no studies examining the optimal duration of financial incentives for quality or the persistence of their effects after termination. Only 1 study addressed cost-effectiveness. LIMITATIONS: Few empirical studies of explicit financial incentives for quality were available for review. CONCLUSIONS: Ongoing monitoring of incentive programs is critical to determine the effectiveness of financial incentives and their possible unintended effects on quality of care. Further research is needed to guide implementation of financial incentives and to assess their cost-effectiveness.
A systematic review of the randomized trial literature examining the impact of financial incentives on provider preventive care delivery was conducted. English-language studies published between 1966 and 2002 that addressed primary or secondary preventive care or health promotion behaviors were included in the review. Six studies that met the inclusion criteria were identified, which generated eight different findings. The literature is sparse. Of the eight financial interventions reviewed, only one led to a significantly greater provision of preventive services. The lack of a significant relationship does not necessarily imply that financial incentives cannot motivate physicians to provide more preventive care. The rewards offered in these studies tend to be small. Therefore, the results suggest that small rewards will not motivate doctors to change their preventive care routines.
Journal»Canadian journal of rural medicine : the official journal of the Society of Rural Physicians of Canada = Journal canadien de la médecine rurale : le journal officiel de la Société de médecine rurale du Canada
OBJECTIVE: To evaluate the effectiveness of programs that provide financial incentives to physicians in exchange for a rural or underserviced area return-of-service (ROS) commitment. METHODS: Medline and Ovid HealthSTAR databases were searched from 1966 to 2002. STUDY SELECTION: The initial search yielded 516 results. Bibliography review yielded additional references. Articles were excluded if they involved financial incentives to change physician behaviours or enhance profit. Ten publications were selected as the highest level of evidence available. The quality of the evidence was low and of limited applicability (1 retrospective and 1 prospective cohort study, the remainder cross-sectional surveys). Three studies were from Canada, 1 from New Zealand, and the remaining 6 were from the United States. RESULTS: Outcome measures included initial recruitment of physicians, buyout rates and long-term retention. The majority of studies reported effective recruitment despite high buyout rates in some US-based programs. Increasing Canadian tuition and debt among medical students may make these programs attractive. The 1 prospective cohort study on retention showed that physicians who chose voluntarily to go to a rural area were far more likely to stay long term than those who located there as an ROS commitment. Multidimensional programs appeared to be more successful than those relying on financial incentives alone. CONCLUSION: ROS programs to rural and underserviced areas have achieved their primary goal of short-term recruitment but have had less success with long-term retention. Additional research is needed to examine the cost effectiveness of existing ROS programs and the incorporation of other retention strategies, such as medical education initiatives, community and professional support, differential rural fees and alternate funding models.
Improving participation in preventive activities will require finding methods to encourage consumers to engage in and remain in such efforts. This review assesses the effects of economic incentives on consumers' preventive health behaviors. A study was classified as complex preventive health if a sustained behavior change was required of the consumer; if it could be accomplished directly (e.g., immunizations), it was considered simple. A systematic literature review identified 111 randomized controlled trials of which 47 (published between 1966 and 2002) met the criteria for review. The economic incentives worked 73% of the time (74% for simple, and 72% for complex). Rates varied by the goal of the incentive. Incentives that increased ability to purchase the preventive service worked better than more diffuse incentives, but the type matters less than the nature of the incentive. Economic incentives are effective in the short run for simple preventive care, and distinct, well-defined behavioral goals. Small incentives can produce finite changes, but it is not clear what size of incentive is needed to yield a major sustained effect.
BACKGROUND: The method by which physicians are paid may affect their professional practice. Although payment systems may be used to achieve policy objectives (e.g. improving quality of care, cost containment and recruitment to under-served areas), little is known about the effects of different payment systems in achieving these objectives. Target payments are a payment system which remunerate professionals only if they provide a minimum level of care.
OBJECTIVES: To evaluate the impact of target payments on the professional practice of primary care physicians (PCPs) and health care outcomes.
SEARCH STRATEGY: We searched the Cochrane Effective Practice and Organisation of Care Group specialised register; the Cochrane Controlled Trials Register; MEDLINE (1966 to October 1997); BIDS EMBASE (1980 to October 1997); BIDS ISI (1981 to October 1997); EconLit (1969 to October 1997); HealthStar (1975 to October 1997) Helmis (1984 to October 1997); health economics discussion paper series of the Universities of York, Aberdeen, Sheffield, Bristol, Brunel, and McMaster; Swedish Institute of Health Economics; RAND corporation; and reference lists of articles.
SELECTION CRITERIA: Randomised trials, controlled before and after studies and interrupted time series analyses of interventions comparing the impact of target payments to primary care professionals with alternative methods of payment, on patient outcomes, health services utilisation, health care costs, equity of care, and PCP satisfaction with working environment.
DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS: Two reviewers independently extracted data and assessed study quality.
MAIN RESULTS: Two studies were included involving 149 practices. The use of target payments in the remuneration of PCPs was associated with improvements in immunisation rates, but the increase was statistically significant in only one of the two studies.
AUTHORS' CONCLUSIONS: The evidence from the studies identified in this review is not of sufficient quality or power to obtain a clear answer to the question as to whether target payment remuneration provides a method of improving primary health care. Additional efforts should be directed in evaluating changes in physicians' remuneration systems. Although it would not be difficult to design a randomised controlled trial to evaluate the impact of such payment systems, it would be difficult politically to conduct such trials.
OBJECTIVE: To determine whether financial incentives increase patients' compliance with healthcare treatments. DATA SOURCES: Systematic literature review of computer databases--Medline, Embase, PsychLit, EconLit, and the Cochrane Database of Clinical Trials. In addition, the reference list of each retrieved article was reviewed and relevant citations retrieved. STUDY SELECTION: Only randomised trials with quantitative data concerning the effect, of financial incentives (cash, vouchers, lottery tickets, or gifts) on compliance with medication, medical advice, or medical appointments were included in the review. Eleven papers were identified as meeting the selection criteria. DATA EXTRACTION: Data on study populations, interventions, and outcomes were extracted and analysed using odds ratios and the number of patients needed to be treated to improve compliance by one patient. RESULTS: 10 of the 11 studies showed improvements in patient compliance with the use of financial incentives. CONCLUSIONS: Financial incentives can improve patient compliance.
Contracting out of governmental health services is a financing strategy that governs the way in which public sector funds are used to have services delivered by non-governmental health service providers (NGPs). It represents a contract between the government and an NGP, detailing the mechanisms and conditions by which the latter should provide health care on behalf of the government. Contracting out is intended to improve the delivery and use of healthcare services. This Review updates a Cochrane Review first published in 2009.
OBJECTIVES:
To assess effects of contracting out governmental clinical health services to non-governmental service provider/s, on (i) utilisation of clinical health services; (ii) improvement in population health outcomes; (iii) improvement in equity of utilisation of these services; (iv) costs and cost-effectiveness of delivering the services; and (v) improvement in health systems performance.
SEARCH METHODS:
We searched CENTRAL, MEDLINE, Embase, NHS Economic Evaluation Database, EconLit, ProQuest, and Global Health on 07 April 2017, along with two trials registers - ClinicalTrials.gov and the International Clinical Trials Registry Platform - on 17 November 2017.
SELECTION CRITERIA:
Individually randomised and cluster-randomised trials, controlled before-after studies, interrupted time series, and repeated measures studies, comparing government-delivered clinical health services versus those contracted out to NGPs, or comparing different models of non-governmental-delivered clinical health services.
DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS:
Two authors independently screened all records, extracted data from the included studies and assessed the risk of bias. We calculated the net effect for all outcomes. A positive value favours the intervention whilst a negative value favours the control. Effect estimates are presented with 95% confidence intervals. We used the Grading of Recommendations Assessment, Development and Evaluation (GRADE) approach to assess the certainty of the evidence and we prepared a Summary of Findings table.
MAIN RESULTS:
We included two studies, a cluster-randomised trial conducted in Cambodia, and a controlled before-after study conducted in Guatemala. Both studies reported that contracting out over 12 months probably makes little or no difference in (i) immunisation uptake of children 12 to 24 months old (moderate-certainty evidence), (ii) the number of women who had more than two antenatal care visits (moderate-certainty evidence), and (iii) female use of contraceptives (moderate-certainty evidence).The Cambodia trial reported that contracting out may make little or no difference in the mortality over 12 months of children younger than one year of age (net effect = -4.3%, intervention effect P = 0.36, clustered standard error (SE) = 3.0%; low-certainty evidence), nor to the incidence of childhood diarrhoea (net effect = -16.2%, intervention effect P = 0.07, clustered SE = 19.0%; low-certainty evidence). The Cambodia study found that contracting out probably reduces individual out-of-pocket spending over 12 months on curative care (net effect = $ -19.25 (2003 USD), intervention effect P = 0.01, clustered SE = $ 5.12; moderate-certainty evidence). The included studies did not report equity in the use of clinical health services and in adverse effects.
AUTHORS' CONCLUSIONS:
This update confirms the findings of the original review. Contracting out probably reduces individual out-of-pocket spending on curative care (moderate-certainty evidence), but probably makes little or no difference in other health utilisation or service delivery outcomes (moderate- to low-certainty evidence). Therefore, contracting out programmes may be no better or worse than government-provided services, although additional rigorously designed studies may change this result. The literature provides many examples of contracting out programmes, which implies that this is a feasible response when governments fail to provide good clinical health care. Future contracting out programmes should be framed within a rigorous study design to allow valid and reliable measures of their effects. Such studies should include qualitative research that assesses the views of programme implementers and beneficiaries, and records implementation mechanisms. This approach may reveal enablers for, and barriers to, successful implementation of such programmes.
