Strengthening good governance and preventing corruption in health care are universal challenges. The Karnataka Lokayukta (KLA), a public complaints agency in Karnataka state (India), was created in 1986 but played a prominent role controlling systemic corruption only after a change of leadership in 2001 with a new Lokayukta (ombudsman) and Vigilance Director for Health (VDH). This case study of the KLA (2001-06) analysed the:Scope and level of poor governance in the health sector; KLA objectives and its strategy; Factors which affected public health sector governance and the operation of the KLA. We used a participatory and opportunistic evaluation design, examined documents about KLA activities, conducted three site visits, two key informant and 44 semi-structured interviews and used a force field model to analyse the governance findings. The Lokayukta and his VDH were both proactive and economically independent with an extended social network, technical expertise in both jurisdiction and health care, and were widely perceived to be acting for the common good. They mobilized media and the public about governance issues which were affected by factors at the individual, organizational and societal levels. Their investigations revealed systemic corruption within the public health sector at all levels as well as in public/private collaborations and the political and justice systems. However, wider contextual issues limited their effectiveness in intervening. The departure of the Lokayukta, upon completing his term, was due to a lack of continued political support for controlling corruption. Governance in the health sector is affected by positive and negative forces. A key positive factor was the combined social, cultural and symbolic capital of the two leaders which empowered them to challenge corrupt behaviour and promote good governance. Although change was possible, it was precarious and requires continuous political support to be sustained.
Within the countries of the former Soviet Union, the Kyrgyz Republic has been a pioneer in reforming the system of health care finance. Since the introduction of its compulsory health insurance fund in 1997, the country has gradually moved from subsidizing the supply of services to subsidizing the purchase of services through the 'single payer' of the health insurance fund. In 2002 the government introduced a new co-payment for inpatients along with a basic benefit package. A key objective of the reforms has been to replace the burgeoning system of unofficial informal payments for health care with a transparent official co-payment, thereby reducing the financial burden of health care spending for the poor. This article investigates trends in out-of-pocket payments for health care using the results of a series of nationally representative household surveys conducted over the period 2001-2007, when the reforms were being rolled out. The analysis shows that there has been a significant improvement in financial access to health care amongst the population. The proportion paying state providers for consultations fell between 2004 and 2007. As a result of the introduction of co-payments for hospital care, fewer inpatients report making payments to medical personnel, but when they are made, payments are high, especially to surgeons and anaesthetists. However, although financial access for outpatient care has improved, the burden of health care payments amongst the poor remains significant.
OBJECTIVE: To assess legislation requiring drug companies to report gifts to providers, and to evaluate the information obtained.
DATA SOURCES: Data included legislation in Vermont, Minnesota, Maine, Massachusetts, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia, and company disclosure data from Vermont.
STUDY DESIGN: We evaluated the strengths and weaknesses of state legislation. We also analyzed 4 years of company disclosures from Vermont, assessing the value and distribution of industry-provider exchanges and identifying emerging trends in companies' practices.
DATA COLLECTION METHODS: State legislation is publically available. We obtained Vermont's data through requests to the state's Attorney General's office.
PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: Of the state laws, only Vermont's yielded robust, publically available data. These data show gifting was dominated by a few major corporations, and <2 percent of Vermont's prescribers received 69 percent of gifts and payments. Companies were especially generous to specialists in psychiatry, endocrinology/diabetes/metabolism, internal medicine, and neurology. Companies increasingly used loopholes in the law to avoid public scrutiny.
CONCLUSIONS: Disclosure laws are an important first step in bringing greater transparency to physician-industry relationships. But flaws and weaknesses limit the states' ability to render physician-industry exchanges fully transparent. Future efforts should build on these lessons to render physician-industry relationships fully transparent.
OBJECTIVE: To examine the general deterrence effect of the Korean government's fraud and abuse enforcement program on medical clinics in the country. The effects were evaluated by analyzing the association between the fear of penalty from a potential onsite investigation and the costliness index (CI).
METHOD: Using a stratified proportional systematic sampling method, 800 out of the 15,443 clinics in Korea that had not had an onsite investigation before June 2007 were selected. Perceived deterrence was measured via face-to-face interviews with the chief doctor of each clinic; these were conducted in July and August 2007. CI was calculated by dividing observed costs by expected costs based on National Health Insurance Claims from January to October 2007.
RESULTS: Clinics with a high fear of penalty had a significantly lower CI than did other clinics after adjusting for factors related to the provider's perception of onsite investigation, the provider's service experiences, and general characteristics such as provider's sex and age.
CONCLUSION: Designing effective fraud and abuse control programs can improve the efficiency of providing services to patients.
BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVE: Several hospitals have issued their own guidelines that regulate the conduct of staff members toward the pharmaceutical industry. The effect of theses guidelines on the attitude of the doctors toward the pharmaceutical industry in Germany has so far been unknown. This study investigated whether hospital doctors with guidelines and those without guidelines differ in their attitude toward the pharmaceutical industry.
METHODS: A retrospective analysis was undertaken to determine the influence of hospital guidelines on the attitude of doctors toward the pharmaceutical industry. In May 2008 all doctors in intensive care of a hospital with and one without guidelines were asked anonymously by a questionnaire about their dealings with the pharmaceutical industry. The response rate was 64.9 % (37/57) and 55.1 % (59/107) respectively. The cooperation rate in both groups was 100 %.
RESULTS: In the hospital with guidelines every doctor was on average carrying 0.56 +/- 0.64 pharmaceutical advertising gifts with a company logo, while the average in the institution without guidelines was 1.2 +/- 0.61 advertising gifts (p = 0.026). Whereas 49 % of doctors with guidelines considered the acceptance of advertising gifts as not questionable, 81 % without guidelines did (p = 0.001; RRR = 0.65; 95 % CI = 0.48-0.91). Furthermore, 70 % of doctors in the institution with guidelines compared with 92 % of those doctors in the hospital without guidelines believed that the advertising practices of the pharmaceutical industry had no influence on their prescribing behaviour (p = 0.010; RRR = 3.6; 95 % CI = 1.36-9.52). Both groups of doctors are convinced that other doctors are more influenced by the pharmaceutical industry than they are themselves (51 % with and 37 % without guidelines, p = 0.207). 70 % and 90 %, respectively of all participants considered hospital guidelines setting standards of conduct toward the pharmaceutical industry and those not sponsored by industry to have a positive effect. Every other doctor additionally stated the advice by the pharmaceutical industry was not helpful for his work.
CONCLUSIONS: Hospital guidelines on relations with the pharmaceutical industry appear to further a critical attitude by physicians regarding the pharmaceutical industry.
This paper identifies which types of patients and hospitals have abusive Medicare billings that are responsive to law enforcement. For a 20% random sample of elderly Medicare beneficiaries hospitalized from 1994 to 1998 with one or more of six illnesses that are prone to abuse, we obtain longitudinal claims data linked with social security death records, hospital characteristics, and state/year-level anti-fraud enforcement efforts. We show that increased enforcement leads certain types of types of patients and hospitals to have lower billings, without adverse consequences for patients' health outcomes.
Strengthening good governance and preventing corruption in health care are universal challenges. The Karnataka Lokayukta (KLA), a public complaints agency in Karnataka state (India), was created in 1986 but played a prominent role controlling systemic corruption only after a change of leadership in 2001 with a new Lokayukta (ombudsman) and Vigilance Director for Health (VDH). This case study of the KLA (2001-06) analysed the:Scope and level of poor governance in the health sector; KLA objectives and its strategy; Factors which affected public health sector governance and the operation of the KLA. We used a participatory and opportunistic evaluation design, examined documents about KLA activities, conducted three site visits, two key informant and 44 semi-structured interviews and used a force field model to analyse the governance findings. The Lokayukta and his VDH were both proactive and economically independent with an extended social network, technical expertise in both jurisdiction and health care, and were widely perceived to be acting for the common good. They mobilized media and the public about governance issues which were affected by factors at the individual, organizational and societal levels. Their investigations revealed systemic corruption within the public health sector at all levels as well as in public/private collaborations and the political and justice systems. However, wider contextual issues limited their effectiveness in intervening. The departure of the Lokayukta, upon completing his term, was due to a lack of continued political support for controlling corruption. Governance in the health sector is affected by positive and negative forces. A key positive factor was the combined social, cultural and symbolic capital of the two leaders which empowered them to challenge corrupt behaviour and promote good governance. Although change was possible, it was precarious and requires continuous political support to be sustained.
