Strengthening good governance and preventing corruption in health care are universal challenges. The Karnataka Lokayukta (KLA), a public complaints agency in Karnataka state (India), was created in 1986 but played a prominent role controlling systemic corruption only after a change of leadership in 2001 with a new Lokayukta (ombudsman) and Vigilance Director for Health (VDH). This case study of the KLA (2001-06) analysed the:Scope and level of poor governance in the health sector; KLA objectives and its strategy; Factors which affected public health sector governance and the operation of the KLA. We used a participatory and opportunistic evaluation design, examined documents about KLA activities, conducted three site visits, two key informant and 44 semi-structured interviews and used a force field model to analyse the governance findings. The Lokayukta and his VDH were both proactive and economically independent with an extended social network, technical expertise in both jurisdiction and health care, and were widely perceived to be acting for the common good. They mobilized media and the public about governance issues which were affected by factors at the individual, organizational and societal levels. Their investigations revealed systemic corruption within the public health sector at all levels as well as in public/private collaborations and the political and justice systems. However, wider contextual issues limited their effectiveness in intervening. The departure of the Lokayukta, upon completing his term, was due to a lack of continued political support for controlling corruption. Governance in the health sector is affected by positive and negative forces. A key positive factor was the combined social, cultural and symbolic capital of the two leaders which empowered them to challenge corrupt behaviour and promote good governance. Although change was possible, it was precarious and requires continuous political support to be sustained.
Within the countries of the former Soviet Union, the Kyrgyz Republic has been a pioneer in reforming the system of health care finance. Since the introduction of its compulsory health insurance fund in 1997, the country has gradually moved from subsidizing the supply of services to subsidizing the purchase of services through the 'single payer' of the health insurance fund. In 2002 the government introduced a new co-payment for inpatients along with a basic benefit package. A key objective of the reforms has been to replace the burgeoning system of unofficial informal payments for health care with a transparent official co-payment, thereby reducing the financial burden of health care spending for the poor. This article investigates trends in out-of-pocket payments for health care using the results of a series of nationally representative household surveys conducted over the period 2001-2007, when the reforms were being rolled out. The analysis shows that there has been a significant improvement in financial access to health care amongst the population. The proportion paying state providers for consultations fell between 2004 and 2007. As a result of the introduction of co-payments for hospital care, fewer inpatients report making payments to medical personnel, but when they are made, payments are high, especially to surgeons and anaesthetists. However, although financial access for outpatient care has improved, the burden of health care payments amongst the poor remains significant.
OBJECTIVE: To assess legislation requiring drug companies to report gifts to providers, and to evaluate the information obtained.
DATA SOURCES: Data included legislation in Vermont, Minnesota, Maine, Massachusetts, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia, and company disclosure data from Vermont.
STUDY DESIGN: We evaluated the strengths and weaknesses of state legislation. We also analyzed 4 years of company disclosures from Vermont, assessing the value and distribution of industry-provider exchanges and identifying emerging trends in companies' practices.
DATA COLLECTION METHODS: State legislation is publically available. We obtained Vermont's data through requests to the state's Attorney General's office.
PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: Of the state laws, only Vermont's yielded robust, publically available data. These data show gifting was dominated by a few major corporations, and <2 percent of Vermont's prescribers received 69 percent of gifts and payments. Companies were especially generous to specialists in psychiatry, endocrinology/diabetes/metabolism, internal medicine, and neurology. Companies increasingly used loopholes in the law to avoid public scrutiny.
CONCLUSIONS: Disclosure laws are an important first step in bringing greater transparency to physician-industry relationships. But flaws and weaknesses limit the states' ability to render physician-industry exchanges fully transparent. Future efforts should build on these lessons to render physician-industry relationships fully transparent.
OBJECTIVE: To examine the general deterrence effect of the Korean government's fraud and abuse enforcement program on medical clinics in the country. The effects were evaluated by analyzing the association between the fear of penalty from a potential onsite investigation and the costliness index (CI).
METHOD: Using a stratified proportional systematic sampling method, 800 out of the 15,443 clinics in Korea that had not had an onsite investigation before June 2007 were selected. Perceived deterrence was measured via face-to-face interviews with the chief doctor of each clinic; these were conducted in July and August 2007. CI was calculated by dividing observed costs by expected costs based on National Health Insurance Claims from January to October 2007.
RESULTS: Clinics with a high fear of penalty had a significantly lower CI than did other clinics after adjusting for factors related to the provider's perception of onsite investigation, the provider's service experiences, and general characteristics such as provider's sex and age.
CONCLUSION: Designing effective fraud and abuse control programs can improve the efficiency of providing services to patients.
BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVE: Several hospitals have issued their own guidelines that regulate the conduct of staff members toward the pharmaceutical industry. The effect of theses guidelines on the attitude of the doctors toward the pharmaceutical industry in Germany has so far been unknown. This study investigated whether hospital doctors with guidelines and those without guidelines differ in their attitude toward the pharmaceutical industry.
METHODS: A retrospective analysis was undertaken to determine the influence of hospital guidelines on the attitude of doctors toward the pharmaceutical industry. In May 2008 all doctors in intensive care of a hospital with and one without guidelines were asked anonymously by a questionnaire about their dealings with the pharmaceutical industry. The response rate was 64.9 % (37/57) and 55.1 % (59/107) respectively. The cooperation rate in both groups was 100 %.
RESULTS: In the hospital with guidelines every doctor was on average carrying 0.56 +/- 0.64 pharmaceutical advertising gifts with a company logo, while the average in the institution without guidelines was 1.2 +/- 0.61 advertising gifts (p = 0.026). Whereas 49 % of doctors with guidelines considered the acceptance of advertising gifts as not questionable, 81 % without guidelines did (p = 0.001; RRR = 0.65; 95 % CI = 0.48-0.91). Furthermore, 70 % of doctors in the institution with guidelines compared with 92 % of those doctors in the hospital without guidelines believed that the advertising practices of the pharmaceutical industry had no influence on their prescribing behaviour (p = 0.010; RRR = 3.6; 95 % CI = 1.36-9.52). Both groups of doctors are convinced that other doctors are more influenced by the pharmaceutical industry than they are themselves (51 % with and 37 % without guidelines, p = 0.207). 70 % and 90 %, respectively of all participants considered hospital guidelines setting standards of conduct toward the pharmaceutical industry and those not sponsored by industry to have a positive effect. Every other doctor additionally stated the advice by the pharmaceutical industry was not helpful for his work.
CONCLUSIONS: Hospital guidelines on relations with the pharmaceutical industry appear to further a critical attitude by physicians regarding the pharmaceutical industry.
Hospitals and health care providers tend to get involved in exaggerated and fraudulent medical claims initiated by national insurance schemes. The present study applies data mining techniques to detect fraudulent or abusive reporting by healthcare providers using their invoices for diabetic outpatient services. This research is pursued in the context of Taiwan's National Health Insurance system. We compare the identification accuracy of three algorithms: logistic regression, neural network, and classification trees. While all three are quite accurate, the classification tree model performs the best with an overall correct identification rate of 99%. It is followed by the neural network (96%) and the logistic regression model (92%).
People rely on government-managed health insurance systems, private health insurance systems, or both to share the expensive healthcare costs. With such an intensive need for health insurances, however, health care service providers' fraudulent and abusive behavior has become a serious problem. In this research, we propose a data-mining framework that utilizes the concept of clinical pathways to facilitate automatic and systematic construction of an adaptable and extensible detection model. The proposed approaches have been evaluated objectively by a real-world data set gathered from the National Health Insurance (NHI) program in Taiwan. The empirical experiments show that our detection model is efficient and capable of identifying some fraudulent and abusive cases that are not detected by a manually constructed detection model.
In 1988, Congress passed the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendment (CLIA), thereby extending coverage of the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Act of 1967 to include quality standards for all laboratory-based testing. The CLIA was enacted to ensure the accuracy, reliability, and timeliness of patient test results, regardless of the location where the tests were performed. This article assessed trends in the enforcement policy of the CLIA through an examination of the Laboratory Registry, an annual publication of those individuals or entities that have had sanctions imposed on them by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. We reviewed the CLIA, including its oversight, regulations that were promulgated based on it, and its enforcement procedures. We obtained the Laboratory Registries for 1993-2001. Sanctions were categorized into groups per the enforcement regulations (42 C.F.R. section sign 493.2 2000). The data indicated an increasing use of more lenient sanctions from 1997 to 2001, and a gradual increase in fraudulent activity for that same period. One possible explanation for this finding is that implementation of compliance plans by participating clinical laboratories had a mitigating effect on enforcement policy. Compliance plan guidance from the OIG provides an opportunity for laboratory service providers to be proactive in their attempts to decrease errors, and thus improve accuracy and reliability by documenting laboratory policies, procedures, and objectives.
Strengthening good governance and preventing corruption in health care are universal challenges. The Karnataka Lokayukta (KLA), a public complaints agency in Karnataka state (India), was created in 1986 but played a prominent role controlling systemic corruption only after a change of leadership in 2001 with a new Lokayukta (ombudsman) and Vigilance Director for Health (VDH). This case study of the KLA (2001-06) analysed the:Scope and level of poor governance in the health sector; KLA objectives and its strategy; Factors which affected public health sector governance and the operation of the KLA. We used a participatory and opportunistic evaluation design, examined documents about KLA activities, conducted three site visits, two key informant and 44 semi-structured interviews and used a force field model to analyse the governance findings. The Lokayukta and his VDH were both proactive and economically independent with an extended social network, technical expertise in both jurisdiction and health care, and were widely perceived to be acting for the common good. They mobilized media and the public about governance issues which were affected by factors at the individual, organizational and societal levels. Their investigations revealed systemic corruption within the public health sector at all levels as well as in public/private collaborations and the political and justice systems. However, wider contextual issues limited their effectiveness in intervening. The departure of the Lokayukta, upon completing his term, was due to a lack of continued political support for controlling corruption. Governance in the health sector is affected by positive and negative forces. A key positive factor was the combined social, cultural and symbolic capital of the two leaders which empowered them to challenge corrupt behaviour and promote good governance. Although change was possible, it was precarious and requires continuous political support to be sustained.
