Pay-for-performance (P4P) has been widely used around the world seeking to improve health outcomes, and in Brazil it is the basis of the National Program for Improving Access and Quality (PMAQ). The literature published between 1998 and January 2013 that evaluated the effectiveness of P4P to produce results or patterns of access and quality in health was scrutinized. A total of 138 studies, with the inclusion of a further 41 studies (14 systematic reviews, 07 clinical trials and 20 observational studies) were retrieved and analyzed Among the more rigorous studies, favorable conclusions for P4P were less frequent, whereas observational studies were more favorable to positive effects of P4P on the quality of, and access to, health services. Methodological limitations of observational studies may have contributed to these results, but the range of results is more linked to the conceptual and contextual aspects of the use of the P4P schemes reviewed, the heterogeneity of P4P models and results. P4P can be helpful in promoting the achievement of objectives in health care systems, especially in the short term and for specific actions requiring less effort of health care providers, but should be used with caution and with a rigorous planning model, also considering undesirable or adverse effects.
BACKGROUND: A vast amount of literature on effects of pay-for-performance (P4P) in health care has been published. However, the evidence has become fragmented and it has become challenging to grasp the information included in it. OBJECTIVES: To provide a comprehensive overview of effects of P4P in a broad sense by synthesizing findings from published systematic reviews. METHODS: Systematic literature search in five electronic databases for English, Spanish, and German language literature published between January 2000 and June 2011, supplemented by reference tracking and Internet searches. Two authors independently reviewed all titles, assessed articles' eligibility for inclusion, determined a methodological quality score for each included article, and extracted relevant data. RESULTS: Twenty-two reviews contain evidence on a wide variety of effects. Findings suggest that P4P can potentially be (cost-)effective, but the evidence is not convincing; many studies failed to find an effect and there are still few studies that convincingly disentangled the P4P effect from the effect of other improvement initiatives. Inequalities among socioeconomic groups have been attenuated, but other inequalities have largely persisted. There is some evidence of unintended consequences, including spillover effects on unincentivized care. Several design features appear important in reaching desired effects. CONCLUSION: Although data is available on a wide variety of effects, strong conclusions cannot be drawn due to a limited number of studies with strong designs. In addition, relevant evidence on particular effects may have been missed because no review has explicitly focused on these effects. More research is necessary on the relative merits of P4P and other types of incentives, as well as on the long-term impact on patient health and costs.
CONTEXT: Screening reduces mortality from breast, cervical, and colorectal cancers. The Guide to Community Preventive Services previously conducted systematic reviews on the effectiveness of 11 interventions to increase screening for these cancers. This article presents results of updated systematic reviews for nine of these interventions.
EVIDENCE ACQUISITION: Five databases were searched for studies published during January 2004-October 2008. Studies had to (1) be a primary investigation of one or more intervention category; (2) be conducted in a country with a high-income economy; (3) provide information on at least one cancer screening outcome of interest; and (4) include screening use prior to intervention implementation or a concurrent group unexposed to the intervention category of interest. Forty-five studies were included in the reviews.
EVIDENCE SYNTHESIS: Recommendations were added for one-on-one education to increase screening with fecal occult blood testing (FOBT) and group education to increase mammography screening. Strength of evidence for client reminder interventions to increase FOBT screening was upgraded from sufficient to strong. Previous findings and recommendations for reducing out-of-pocket costs (breast cancer screening); provider assessment and feedback (breast, cervical, and FOBT screening); one-on-one education and client reminders (breast and cervical cancer screening); and reducing structural barriers (breast cancer and FOBT screening) were reaffirmed or unchanged. Evidence remains insufficient to determine effectiveness for the remaining screening tests and intervention categories.
CONCLUSIONS: Findings indicate new and reaffirmed interventions effective in promoting recommended cancer screening, including colorectal cancer screening. Findings can be used in community and healthcare settings to promote recommended care. Important research gaps also are described.
BACKGROUND: There is considerable interest in the effectiveness of financial incentives in the delivery of health care. Incentives may be used in an attempt to increase the use of evidence-based treatments among healthcare professionals or to stimulate health professionals to change their clinical behaviour with respect to preventive, diagnostic and treatment decisions, or both. Financial incentives are an extrinsic source of motivation and exist when an individual can expect a monetary transfer which is made conditional on acting in a particular way. Since there are numerous reviews performed within the healthcare area describing the effects of various types of financial incentives, it is important to summarise the effectiveness of these in an overview to discern which are most effective in changing health professionals' behaviour and patient outcomes. OBJECTIVES: To conduct an overview of systematic reviews that evaluates the impact of financial incentives on healthcare professional behaviour and patient outcomes. METHODS: We searched the Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews (CDSR) (The Cochrane Library); Database of Abstracts of Reviews of Effectiveness (DARE); TRIP; MEDLINE; EMBASE; Science Citation Index; Social Science Citation Index; NHS EED; HEED; EconLit; and Program in Policy Decision-Making (PPd) (from their inception dates up to January 2010). We searched the reference lists of all included reviews and carried out a citation search of those papers which cited studies included in the review. We included both Cochrane and non-Cochrane reviews of randomised controlled trials (RCTs), controlled clinical trials (CCTs), interrupted time series (ITSs) and controlled before and after studies (CBAs) that evaluated the effects of financial incentives on professional practice and patient outcomes, and that reported numerical results of the included individual studies. Two review authors independently extracted data and assessed the methodological quality of each review according to the AMSTAR criteria. We included systematic reviews of studies evaluating the effectiveness of any type of financial incentive. We grouped financial incentives into five groups: payment for working for a specified time period; payment for each service, episode or visit; payment for providing care for a patient or specific population; payment for providing a pre-specified level or providing a change in activity or quality of care; and mixed or other systems. We summarised data using vote counting. MAIN RESULTS: We identified four reviews reporting on 32 studies. Two reviews scored 7 on the AMSTAR criteria (moderate, score 5 to 7, quality) and two scored 9 (high, score 8 to 11, quality). The reported quality of the included studies was, by a variety of methods, low to moderate. Payment for working for a specified time period was generally ineffective, improving 3/11 outcomes from one study reported in one review. Payment for each service, episode or visit was generally effective, improving 7/10 outcomes from five studies reported in three reviews; payment for providing care for a patient or specific population was generally effective, improving 48/69 outcomes from 13 studies reported in two reviews; payment for providing a pre-specified level or providing a change in activity or quality of care was generally effective, improving 17/20 reported outcomes from 10 studies reported in two reviews; and mixed and other systems were of mixed effectiveness, improving 20/31 reported outcomes from seven studies reported in three reviews. When looking at the effect of financial incentives overall across categories of outcomes, they were of mixed effectiveness on consultation or visit rates (improving 10/17 outcomes from three studies in two reviews); generally effective in improving processes of care (improving 41/57 outcomes from 19 studies in three reviews); generally effective in improving referrals and admissions (improving 11/16 outcomes from 11 studies in four reviews); generally ineffective in improving compliance with guidelines outcomes (improving 5/17 outcomes from five studies in two reviews); and generally effective in improving prescribing costs outcomes (improving 28/34 outcomes from 10 studies in one review). AUTHORS' CONCLUSIONS: Financial incentives may be effective in changing healthcare professional practice. The evidence has serious methodological limitations and is also very limited in its completeness and generalisability. We found no evidence from reviews that examined the effect of financial incentives on patient outcomes.
KEY MESSAGES: - There is now extensive evidence demonstrating that there is a gap between the health care that patients receive and the practice that is recommended. In both primary and secondary care there are unwarranted variations in practice and in resulting outcomes that cannot be explained by the characteristics of patients.
- While it is difficult to find examples of measures for addressing this issue from all 53 countries of the World Health Organization’s European Region, there are interventions that can be identified in the 27 Member States of the European Union. However, the nature of these measures and the extent to which they are implemented vary considerably.
- Audit and feedback defined as “any summary of clinical performance of health care over a specified period of time aimed at providing information to health professionals to allow them to assess and adjust their performance” is an overarching term used to describe some of the measures that are used to improve professional practice.
- Audit and feedback can be used in all health care settings, involving all health professionals, either as individual professions or in multiprofessional teams.
- In practical terms, health professionals can receive feedback on their performance based on data derived from their routine practice. Health professionals involved in audit and feedback may work either in a team or individually and in primary, secondary or tertiary care.
- While it seems intuitive that health care professionals would be prompted to modify their clinical practice if receiving feedback that it was inconsistent with that of their peers or accepted guidelines, this is in fact not always the case.
- The available evidence suggests that audit and feedback may be effective in improving professional practice but that the effects are generally small to moderate. Nonetheless, depending on the context, such small effects, particularly if shown to be cost-effective, may still be regarded as worthwhile.
- The benefits of audit and feedback measures are most likely to occur where existing practice is furthest away from what is desired, and when feedback is more intensive.
- Even on the basis of the best evidence available, no strong recommendations can be given regarding the best way to introduce audit and feedback into routine practice. However, decisions about if, and how, this approach can Policy summary be used to improve professional practice must be guided by pragmatism and the consideration of local circumstances. The following scenarios, for example, might indicate suitability for such an approach: the known (or anticipated) level of initial adherence to guidelines or desired practice is low; it is feasible to conduct an audit and the associated costs of collecting the data are low; routinely collected data are reliable and appropriate for use in an audit; and small to moderate improvements in quality would be worthwhile.
- The cost of audit and feedback is highly variable and is determined by local conditions, including the availability of reliable routinely collected data and personnel costs.
- The impact of audit and feedback, with or without additional interventions, should be monitored routinely by auditing practice after the intervention.
OBJECTIVE: Results-based financing and pay-for-performance refer to the transfer of money or material goods conditional on taking a measurable action or achieving a predetermined performance target. Results-based financing is widely advocated for achieving health goals, including the Millennium Development Goals.
METHODS: We undertook an overview of systematic reviews of the effectiveness of RBF. We searched the Cochrane Library, EMBASE, and MEDLINE (up to August 2007). We also searched for related articles in PubMed, checked the reference lists of retrieved articles, and contacted key informants. We included reviews with a methods section that addressed the effects of any results-based financing in the health sector targeted at patients, providers, organizations, or governments. We summarized the characteristics and findings of each review using a structured format.
RESULTS: We found 12 systematic reviews that met our inclusion criteria. Based on the findings of these reviews, financial incentives targeting recipients of health care and individual healthcare professionals are effective in the short run for simple and distinct, well-defined behavioral goals. There is less evidence that financial incentives can sustain long-term changes. Conditional cash transfers to poor and disadvantaged groups in Latin America are effective at increasing the uptake of some preventive services. There is otherwise very limited evidence of the effects of results-based financing in low- or middle-income countries. Results-based financing can have undesirable effects, including motivating unintended behaviors, distortions (ignoring important tasks that are not rewarded with incentives), gaming (improving or cheating on reporting rather than improving performance), widening the resource gap between rich and poor, and dependency on financial incentives.
CONCLUSION: There is limited evidence of the effectiveness of results-based financing and almost no evidence of the cost-effectiveness of results-based financing. Based on the available evidence and likely mechanisms through which financial incentives work, they are more likely to influence discrete individual behaviors in the short run and less likely to create sustained changes.
Report»Report Nr 16-2008. Oslo: Nasjonalt kunnskapssenter for helsetjenesten
Year»2008
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BACKGROUND: Norway is the lead promoter of results-based financing (RBF) as one of fi ve actions being taken as part of the Global Campaign for the Health Millennium Development Goals and plans to support the use of RBF through the World Bank and in bilateral agreements with selected countries focusing on achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of reducing child and maternal mortality (MDG 4 and 5). RBF-schemes can be targeted at different levels: recipients of healthcare, individual providers of healthcare, healthcare facilities, private sector organisations, public sector organisations, sub-national governments, and national governments. METHOD: This report consists of an overview of systematic reviews and a critical appraisal of four evaluations of RBF schemes in the health sector in low and middle-income countries (LMIC). RESULTS: Ten systematic reviews that met the inclusion criteria for this report were summarised. In addition, four evaluations of RBF schemes in LMIC were critically appraised, including financial incentives targeted at patients, individual providers, organisations, and governments. There are few rigorous studies of RBF and overall the evidence of its effects is weak.
• Financial incentives targeting recipients of healthcare and individual healthcare professionals appear to be effective in the short run for simple and distinct, well-defined behavioural goals. There is less evidence that financial incentives can sustain long-term changes.
• The use of RBF in LMIC has commonly been as part of a package that may include increased funding, technical support, training, changes in management, and new information systems. It is not possible to disentangle the effects of RBF and there is very limited quantitative evidence of RBF per se having an effect, other than in the context of conditional cash transfers to poor and disadvantaged groups in Latin America to motivate preventive care.
Strengthening health systems is a key challenge to improving the delivery of cost-effective interventions in primary health care and achieving the vision of the Alma-Ata Declaration. Effective governance, financial and delivery arrangements within health systems, and effective implementation strategies are needed urgently in low-income and middle-income countries. This overview summarises the evidence from systematic reviews of health systems arrangements and implementation strategies, with a particular focus on evidence relevant to primary health care in such settings. Although evidence is sparse, there are several promising health systems arrangements and implementation strategies for strengthening primary health care. However, their introduction must be accompanied by rigorous evaluations. The evidence base needs urgently to be strengthened, synthesised, and taken into account in policy and practice, particularly for the benefit of those who have been excluded from the health care advances of recent decades.
Pay-for-performance (P4P) has been widely used around the world seeking to improve health outcomes, and in Brazil it is the basis of the National Program for Improving Access and Quality (PMAQ). The literature published between 1998 and January 2013 that evaluated the effectiveness of P4P to produce results or patterns of access and quality in health was scrutinized. A total of 138 studies, with the inclusion of a further 41 studies (14 systematic reviews, 07 clinical trials and 20 observational studies) were retrieved and analyzed Among the more rigorous studies, favorable conclusions for P4P were less frequent, whereas observational studies were more favorable to positive effects of P4P on the quality of, and access to, health services. Methodological limitations of observational studies may have contributed to these results, but the range of results is more linked to the conceptual and contextual aspects of the use of the P4P schemes reviewed, the heterogeneity of P4P models and results. P4P can be helpful in promoting the achievement of objectives in health care systems, especially in the short term and for specific actions requiring less effort of health care providers, but should be used with caution and with a rigorous planning model, also considering undesirable or adverse effects.
