Background: Outpatient care facilities provide a variety of basic healthcare services to individuals who do not require hospitalisation or institutionalisation, and are usually the patient's first contact. The provision of outpatient care contributes to immediate and large gains in health status, and a large portion of total health expenditure goes to outpatient healthcare services. Payment method is one of the most important incentive methods applied by purchasers to guide the performance of outpatient care providers. Objectives: To assess the impact of different payment methods on the performance of outpatient care facilities and to analyse the differences in impact of payment methods in different settings. Search methods: We searched the Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials (CENTRAL), 2016, Issue 3, part of the Cochrane Library (searched 8 March 2016); MEDLINE, OvidSP (searched 8 March 2016); Embase, OvidSP (searched 24 April 2014); PubMed (NCBI) (searched 8 March 2016); Dissertations and Theses Database, ProQuest (searched 8 March 2016); Conference Proceedings Citation Index (ISI Web of Science) (searched 8 March 2016); IDEAS (searched 8 March 2016); EconLit, ProQuest (searched 8 March 2016); POPLINE, K4Health (searched 8 March 2016); China National Knowledge Infrastructure (searched 8 March 2016); Chinese Medicine Premier (searched 8 March 2016); OpenGrey (searched 8 March 2016); ClinicalTrials.gov, US National Institutes of Health (NIH) (searched 8 March 2016); World Health Organization (WHO) International Clinical Trials Registry Platform (ICTRP) (searched 8 March 2016); and the website of the World Bank (searched 8 March 2016). In addition, we searched the reference lists of included studies and carried out a citation search for the included studies via ISI Web of Science to find other potentially relevant studies. We also contacted authors of the main included studies regarding any further published or unpublished work. Selection criteria: Randomised trials, non-randomised trials, controlled before-after studies, interrupted time series, and repeated measures studies that compared different payment methods for outpatient health facilities. We defined outpatient care facilities in this review as facilities that provide health services to individuals who do not require hospitalisation or institutionalisation. We only included methods used to transfer funds from the purchaser of healthcare services to health facilities (including groups of individual professionals). These include global budgets, line-item budgets, capitation, fee-for-service (fixed and unconstrained), pay for performance, and mixed payment. The primary outcomes were service provision outcomes, patient outcomes, healthcare provider outcomes, costs for providers, and any adverse effects. Data collection and analysis: At least two review authors independently extracted data and assessed the risk of bias. We conducted a structured synthesis. We first categorised the comparisons and outcomes and then described the effects of different types of payment methods on different categories of outcomes. We used a fixed-effect model for meta-analysis within a study if a study included more than one indicator in the same category of outcomes. We used a random-effects model for meta-analysis across studies. If the data for meta-analysis were not available in some studies, we calculated the median and interquartile range. We reported the risk ratio (RR) for dichotomous outcomes and the relative change for continuous outcomes. Main results: We included 21 studies from Afghanistan, Burundi, China, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Tanzania, the United Kingdom, and the United States of health facilities providing primary health care and mental health care. There were three kinds of payment comparisons. 1) Pay for performance (P4P) combined with some existing payment method (capitation or different kinds of input-based payment) compared to the existing payment method We included 18 studies in this comparison, however we did not include five studies in the effects analysis due to high risk of bias. From the 13 studies, we found that the extra P4P incentives probably slightly improved the health professionals' use of some tests and treatments (adjusted RR median = 1.095, range 1.01 to 1.17; moderate-certainty evidence), and probably led to little or no difference in adherence to quality assurance criteria (adjusted percentage change median = -1.345%, range -8.49% to 5.8%; moderate-certainty evidence). We also found that P4P incentives may have led to little or no difference in patients' utilisation of health services (adjusted RR median = 1.01, range 0.96 to 1.15; low-certainty evidence) and may have led to little or no difference in the control of blood pressure or cholesterol (adjusted RR = 1.01, range 0.98 to 1.04; low-certainty evidence). 2) Capitation combined with P4P compared to fee-for-service (FFS) One study found that compared with FFS, a capitated budget combined with payment based on providers' performance on antibiotic prescriptions and patient satisfaction probably slightly reduced antibiotic prescriptions in primary health facilities (adjusted RR 0.84, 95% confidence interval 0.74 to 0.96; moderate-certainty evidence). 3) Capitation compared to FFS Two studies compared capitation to FFS in mental health centres in the United States. Based on these studies, the effects of capitation compared to FFS on the utilisation and costs of services were uncertain (very low-certainty evidence). Authors' conclusions: Our review found that if policymakers intend to apply P4P incentives to pay health facilities providing outpatient services, this intervention will probably lead to a slight improvement in health professionals' use of tests or treatments, particularly for chronic diseases. However, it may lead to little or no improvement in patients' utilisation of health services or health outcomes. When considering using P4P to improve the performance of health facilities, policymakers should carefully consider each component of their P4P design, including the choice of performance measures, the performance target, payment frequency, if there will be additional funding, whether the payment level is sufficient to change the behaviours of health providers, and whether the payment to facilities will be allocated to individual professionals. Unfortunately, the studies included in this review did not help to inform those considerations. Well-designed comparisons of different payment methods for outpatient health facilities in low- and middle-income countries and studies directly comparing different designs (e.g. different payment levels) of the same payment method (e.g. P4P or FFS) are needed.
BACKGROUND: The benefits of pay-for-performance (P4P) programs are uncertain.
PURPOSE: To update and expand a prior review examining the effects of P4P programs targeted at the physician, group, managerial, or institutional level on process-of-care and patient outcomes in ambulatory and inpatient settings.
DATA SOURCES: PubMed from June 2007 to October 2016; MEDLINE, PsycINFO, CINAHL, Business Economics and Theory, Business Source Elite, Scopus, Faculty of 1000, and Gartner Research from June 2007 to February 2016.
STUDY SELECTION: Trials and observational studies in ambulatory and inpatient settings reporting process-of-care, health, or utilization outcomes.
DATA EXTRACTION: Two investigators extracted data, assessed study quality, and graded the strength of the evidence.
DATA SYNTHESIS: Among 69 studies, 58 were in ambulatory settings, 52 reported process-of-care outcomes, and 38 reported patient outcomes. Low-strength evidence suggested that P4P programs in ambulatory settings may improve process-of-care outcomes over the short term (2 to 3 years), whereas data on longer-term effects were limited. Many of the positive studies were conducted in the United Kingdom, where incentives were larger than in the United States. The largest improvements were seen in areas where baseline performance was poor. There was no consistent effect of P4P on intermediate health outcomes (low-strength evidence) and insufficient evidence to characterize any effect on patient health outcomes. In the hospital setting, there was low-strength evidence that P4P had little or no effect on patient health outcomes and a positive effect on reducing hospital readmissions.
LIMITATION: Few methodologically rigorous studies; heterogeneous population and program characteristics and incentive targets.
CONCLUSION: Pay-for-performance programs may be associated with improved processes of care in ambulatory settings, but consistently positive associations with improved health outcomes have not been demonstrated in any setting.
PRIMARY FUNDING SOURCE: U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs.
BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES: Pay-for-performance is a financial incentive which links physicians' income to the quality of their services. Although pay-for-performance is suggested to be an effective payment method in many pilot countries (ie the UK) and enjoys a wide application in primary health care, researches on it are yet to reach an agreement. Thus, a systematic review was conducted on the evidence of impact of pay-for-performance on behavior of primary care physicians and patient outcomes aiming to provide a comprehensive and objective evaluation of pay-for-performance for decision-makers.
METHODS: Studies were identified by searching PubMed, EMbase, and The Cochrane Library. Electronic search was conducted in the fourth week of January 2013. As the included studies had significant clinical heterogeneity, a descriptive analysis was conducted. Quality Index was adopted for quality assessment of evidences.
RESULTS: Database searches yielded 651 candidate articles, of which 44 studies fulfilled the inclusion criteria. An overall positive effect was found on the management of disease, which varied in accordance with the baseline medical quality and the practice size. Meanwhile, it could bring about new problems regarding the inequity, patients' dissatisfaction and increasing medical cost.
CONCLUSIONS: Decision-makers should consider the baseline conditions of medical quality and the practice size before new medical policies are enacted. Furthermore, most studies are retrospective and observational with high level of heterogeneity though, the descriptive analysis is still of significance.
OBJECTIVE: To evaluate the state of quality of care for osteoarthritis (OA) by summarizing studies that have assessed the care provided to patients.
METHODS: A systematic review of community-based observational studies of actual clinical practice treating people with OA compared with quality indicators (QIs) was performed. Four databases were searched from January 2000 to November 2015. Two reviewers independently determined study eligibility, assessed risk of bias, and extracted study data. The outcome was adherence to the QIs (pass rate). The overall pass rate (the total number of indicators passed divided by the total number of indicators for which the patients were eligible) was extracted from each study. When at least 50% of the studies had comparable individual QIs, the data were pooled with proportion meta-analyses.
RESULTS: Fifteen studies comprising 16,103 patients were included, and the median overall pass rate across studies was 41% (range 22-65%). The pooled pass rates for individual QIs were "referral to orthopedic surgeon if no response to other therapy": 59.4% (95% confidence interval [95% CI] 47.5-70.3); "paracetamol or acetaminophen first drug used": 46.0% (95% CI 26.6-66.7); "assessed for pain and/or function": 45.5% (95% CI 33.9-57.6); "referral or recommendation to exercise": 38.7% (28.9-49.5); "offered education and self-management": 35.4% (95% CI 27.8-44.0); and "informed about potential risks if NSAIDs prescribed": 34.1% (95% CI 24.7-44.9).
CONCLUSION: There is room for improvement in community-based OA care.
BACKGROUND: Over the last decade, various pay-for-performance (P4P) programs have been implemented to improve quality in health systems, including the VHA. P4P programs are complex, and their effects may vary by design, context, and other implementation processes. We conducted a systematic review and key informant (KI) interviews to better understand the implementation factors that modify the effectiveness of P4P.
METHODS: We searched PubMed, PsycINFO, and CINAHL through April 2014, and reviewed reference lists. We included trials and observational studies of P4P implementation. Two investigators abstracted data and assessed study quality. We interviewed P4P researchers to gain further insight.
RESULTS: Among 1363 titles and abstracts, we selected 509 for full-text review, and included 41 primary studies. Of these 41 studies, 33 examined P4P programs in ambulatory settings, 7 targeted hospitals, and 1 study applied to nursing homes. Related to implementation, 13 studies examined program design, 8 examined implementation processes, 6 the outer setting, 18 the inner setting, and 5 provider characteristics. Results suggest the importance of considering underlying payment models and using statistically stringent methods of composite measure development, and ensuring that high-quality care will be maintained after incentive removal. We found no conclusive evidence that provider or practice characteristics relate to P4P effectiveness. Interviews with 14 KIs supported limited evidence that effective P4P program measures should be aligned with organizational goals, that incentive structures should be carefully considered, and that factors such as a strong infrastructure and public reporting may have a large influence.
DISCUSSION: There is limited evidence from which to draw firm conclusions related to P4P implementation. Findings from studies and KI interviews suggest that P4P programs should undergo regular evaluation and should target areas of poor performance. Additionally, measures and incentives should align with organizational priorities, and programs should allow for changes over time in response to data and provider input.
BACKGROUND: The proportion of total healthcare expenditures spent on drugs has continued to grow in countries of all income categories. Policy-makers are under pressure to control pharmaceutical expenditures without adversely affecting quality of care. Financial incentives seeking to influence prescribers' behaviour include budgetary arrangements at primary care and hospital settings (pharmaceutical budget caps or targets), financial rewards for target behaviours or outcomes (pay for performance interventions) and reduced benefit margin for prescribers based on medicine sales and prescriptions (pharmaceutical reimbursement rate reduction policies). This is the first update of the original version of this review.
OBJECTIVES: To determine the effects of pharmaceutical policies using financial incentives to influence prescribers' practices on drug use, healthcare utilisation, health outcomes and costs (expenditures).
SEARCH METHODS: We searched the Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials (CENTRAL) (searched 29/01/2015); MEDLINE, Ovid SP (searched 29/01/2015); EMBASE, Ovid SP (searched 29/01/2015); International Network for Rational Use of Drugs (INRUD) Bibliography (searched 29/01/2015); National Health Service (NHS) Economic Evaluation Database (searched 29/01/2015); EconLit - ProQuest (searched 02/02/2015); and Science Citation Index and Social Sciences Citation Index, Institute for Scientific Information (ISI) Web of Knowledge (citation search for included studies searched 10/02/2015). We screened the reference lists of relevant reports and contacted study authors and organisations to identify additional studies.
SELECTION CRITERIA: We included policies that intend to affect prescribing by means of financial incentives for prescribers. Included in this category are pharmaceutical budget caps or targets, pay for performance and drug reimbursement rate reductions and other financial policies, if they were specifically targeted at prescribing or drug utilisation. Policies in this review were defined as laws, rules, regulations and financial and administrative orders made or implemented by payers such as national or local governments, non-government organisations, private or social insurers and insurance-like organisations. One of the following outcomes had to be reported: drug use, healthcare utilisation, health outcomes or costs. The study had to be a randomised or non-randomised trial, an interrupted time series (ITS) analysis, a repeated measures study or a controlled before-after (CBA) study.
DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS: At least two review authors independently assessed eligibility for inclusion of studies and risks of bias using Cochrane Effective Practice and Organisation of Care (EPOC) criteria and extracted data from the included studies. For CBA studies, we reported relative effects (e.g. adjusted relative change). The review team re-analysed all ITS results. When possible, the review team also re-analysed CBA data as ITS data.
MAIN RESULTS: Eighteen evaluations (six new studies) of pharmaceutical policies from six high-income countries met our inclusion criteria. Fourteen studies evaluated pharmaceutical budget policies in the UK (nine studies), two in Germany and Ireland and one each in Sweden and Taiwan. Three studies assessed pay for performance policies in the UK (two) and the Netherlands (one). One study from Taiwan assessed a reimbursement rate reduction policy. ITS analyses had some limitations. All CBA studies had serious limitations. No study from low-income or middle-income countries met the inclusion criteria.Pharmaceutical budgets may lead to a modest reduction in drug use (median relative change -2.8%; low-certainty evidence). We are uncertain of the effects of the policy on drug costs or healthcare utilisation, as the certainty of such evidence has been assessed as very low. Effects of this policy on health outcomes were not reported. Effects of pay for performance policies on drug use and health outcomes are uncertain, as the certainty of such evidence has been assessed as very low. Effects of this policy on drug costs and healthcare utilisation have not been measured. Effects of the reimbursement rate reduction policy on drug use and drug costs are uncertain, as the certainty of such evidence has been assessed as very low. No included study assessed the effects of this policy on healthcare utilisation or health outcomes. Administration costs of the policies were not reported in any of the included studies.
AUTHORS' CONCLUSIONS: Although financial incentives are considered an important element in strategies to change prescribing patterns, limited evidence of their effects can be found. Effects of policies, including pay for performance policies, in improving quality of care and health outcomes remain uncertain. Because pharmaceutical policies have uncertain effects, and because they might cause harm as well as benefit, proper evaluation of these policies is needed. Future studies should consider the impact of these policies on health outcomes, drug use and overall healthcare expenditures, as well as on drug expenditures.
Objective: To review international policies to control expenditure on pharmaceuticals by influencing the behaviour of patients and providers and regulating the pharmaceutical industry. Method: Systematic review of experimental and quasi-experimental studies. Published studies were identified with an electronic search strategy using MEDLINE and EMBASE from 1980 to May 2012. Studies were eligible if they assessed the effect of policies aimed at influencing the behaviour of patients and providers, and regulating the pharmaceutical industry. Outcome measures included pharmaceutical expenditure, prices or utilization; other resource use relating to pharmaceuticals; and health outcomes and patients’ or providers’ behaviour relating to pharmaceutical use. Quality assessment criteria for each study design were developed based on the standard criteria recommended by the Cochrane Effective Practice and Organisation of Care (EPOC) group. The review includes studies based on randomized controlled trials and rigorous quasi-experimental designs (interrupted time-series and controlled before-and-after studies). Studies were excluded if they were conducted within a single hospital or practice; related to pharmaceutical care services or disease management; had less than 6 months of follow-up period (or less than 12 months overall for interrupted time series); if data in controlled before-and-after studies were not collected contemporaneously or if no rationale was stated for the choice of control group; or if relevant and interpretable data were not presented. Results: A total of 255 studies met the inclusion criteria for this review. The majority of the studies relating to patients evaluated cost sharing interventions such as user charges (52 studies). User charges do reduce utilization of pharmaceuticals, and reduce public expenditure by shifting costs to patients. But they reduce the use of essential as well as nonessential drugs, and without adequate exemptions they affect vulnerable groups disproportionately. The majority of studies relating to doctors evaluated the effects of educational approaches (78 studies), reimbursement restrictions (48 studies) and incentive systems (22 studies). Evidence on these policies is of mixed quality. It appears possible to influence prescribing modestly, through various means, but it is essential that messages to prescribers are based on good evidence of effectiveness and cost-effectiveness. Twenty-nine studies related to industry regulation, and they were of mixed quality. Evidence from studies of reference pricing suggests that this may result in cost savings. These are, however, achieved not by companies reducing or restraining prices, or by reductions in the overall volume of prescriptions, but by some shifts in use and shifting costs to patients, with consequent adverse effects on the equity of access to medicines. Other price and profit controls remain almost completely lacking in evaluative evidence. Conclusions: It may be that the undesirable consequences of policies influencing patients, particularly user charges, can outweigh the benefits. To influence demand for pharmaceuticals, it is more appropriate to influence prescribing doctors and although interventions to improve prescribing practice have been developed, they often achieve relatively modest benefits and sometimes at high cost. Good evaluative evidence related to industry regulation is scarce despite its policy importance.
BACKGROUND: The quality and outcomes framework (QOF) is one of the world's largest pay-for-performance schemes, rewarding general practitioners for the quality of care they provide. This review examines the evidence on the efficacy of the scheme for improving health outcomes, its impact on non-incentivized activities and the robustness of the clinical targets adopted in the scheme.
METHODS: The review was conducted using six electronic databases, six sources of grey literature and bibliography searches from relevant publications. Studies were identified using a comprehensive search strategy based on MeSH terms and keyword searches. A total of 21,543 references were identified of which 32 met the eligibility criteria with 11 studies selected for the review.
RESULTS: Findings provide strong evidence that the QOF initially improved health outcomes for a limited number of conditions but subsequently fell to the pre-existing trend. There was limited impact on non-incentivized activities with adverse effects for some sub-population groups.
CONCLUSION: The QOF has limited impact on improving health outcomes due to its focus on process-based indicators and the indicators' ceiling thresholds. Further research is required to strengthen the quality of evidence available on the QOF's impact on population health to ensure that the incentive scheme is both clinically and cost-effective.
INTRODUCTION: Quality of care could be influenced by individual socio-economic status (SES) and by residential area deprivation. The objective is to synthesize the current evidence regarding inequalities in health care for patients with Type 2 diabetes mellitus (Type 2 DM).
METHODS: The systematic review focuses on inequalities concerning process (e.g. measurement of HbA1c, i.e. glycolised haemoglobin) and intermediate outcome indicators (e.g. HbA1c level) of Type 2 diabetes care. In total, of n = 886 publications screened, n = 21 met the inclusion criteria.
RESULTS: A wide variety of definitions for 'good quality diabetes care', regional deprivation and individual SES was observed. Despite differences in research approaches, there is a trend towards worse health care for patients with low SES, concerning both process of care and intermediate outcome indicators. Patients living in deprived areas less often achieve glycaemic control targets, tend to have higher blood pressure (BP) and worse lipid profile control.
CONCLUSION: The available evidence clearly points to the fact that socio-economic inequalities in diabetes care do exist. Low individual SES and residential area deprivation are often associated with worse process indicators and worse intermediate outcomes, resulting in higher risks of microvascular and macrovascular complications. These inequalities exist across different health care systems. Recommendations for further research are provided.
OBJECTIVES: To conduct a systematic review to identify studies that describe factors and interventions at primary care practice level that impact on levels of utilisation of unscheduled secondary care.
SETTING: Observational studies at primary care practice level.
PARTICIPANTS: Studies included people of any age of either sex living in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries with any health condition.
PRIMARY AND SECONDARY OUTCOME MEASURES: The primary outcome measure was unscheduled secondary care as measured by emergency department attendance and emergency hospital admissions.
RESULTS: 48 papers were identified describing potential influencing features on emergency department visits (n=24 studies) and emergency admissions (n=22 studies). Patient factors associated with both outcomes were increased age, reduced socioeconomic status, lower educational attainment, chronic disease and multimorbidity. Features of primary care affecting unscheduled secondary care were more complex. Being able to see the same healthcare professional reduced unscheduled secondary care. Generally, better access was associated with reduced unscheduled care in the USA. Proximity to healthcare provision influenced patterns of use. Evidence relating to quality of care was limited and mixed.
CONCLUSIONS: The majority of research was from different healthcare systems and limited in the extent to which it can inform policy. However, there is evidence that continuity of care is associated with reduced emergency department attendance and emergency hospital admissions.
Background: Outpatient care facilities provide a variety of basic healthcare services to individuals who do not require hospitalisation or institutionalisation, and are usually the patient's first contact. The provision of outpatient care contributes to immediate and large gains in health status, and a large portion of total health expenditure goes to outpatient healthcare services. Payment method is one of the most important incentive methods applied by purchasers to guide the performance of outpatient care providers. Objectives: To assess the impact of different payment methods on the performance of outpatient care facilities and to analyse the differences in impact of payment methods in different settings. Search methods: We searched the Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials (CENTRAL), 2016, Issue 3, part of the Cochrane Library (searched 8 March 2016); MEDLINE, OvidSP (searched 8 March 2016); Embase, OvidSP (searched 24 April 2014); PubMed (NCBI) (searched 8 March 2016); Dissertations and Theses Database, ProQuest (searched 8 March 2016); Conference Proceedings Citation Index (ISI Web of Science) (searched 8 March 2016); IDEAS (searched 8 March 2016); EconLit, ProQuest (searched 8 March 2016); POPLINE, K4Health (searched 8 March 2016); China National Knowledge Infrastructure (searched 8 March 2016); Chinese Medicine Premier (searched 8 March 2016); OpenGrey (searched 8 March 2016); ClinicalTrials.gov, US National Institutes of Health (NIH) (searched 8 March 2016); World Health Organization (WHO) International Clinical Trials Registry Platform (ICTRP) (searched 8 March 2016); and the website of the World Bank (searched 8 March 2016). In addition, we searched the reference lists of included studies and carried out a citation search for the included studies via ISI Web of Science to find other potentially relevant studies. We also contacted authors of the main included studies regarding any further published or unpublished work. Selection criteria: Randomised trials, non-randomised trials, controlled before-after studies, interrupted time series, and repeated measures studies that compared different payment methods for outpatient health facilities. We defined outpatient care facilities in this review as facilities that provide health services to individuals who do not require hospitalisation or institutionalisation. We only included methods used to transfer funds from the purchaser of healthcare services to health facilities (including groups of individual professionals). These include global budgets, line-item budgets, capitation, fee-for-service (fixed and unconstrained), pay for performance, and mixed payment. The primary outcomes were service provision outcomes, patient outcomes, healthcare provider outcomes, costs for providers, and any adverse effects. Data collection and analysis: At least two review authors independently extracted data and assessed the risk of bias. We conducted a structured synthesis. We first categorised the comparisons and outcomes and then described the effects of different types of payment methods on different categories of outcomes. We used a fixed-effect model for meta-analysis within a study if a study included more than one indicator in the same category of outcomes. We used a random-effects model for meta-analysis across studies. If the data for meta-analysis were not available in some studies, we calculated the median and interquartile range. We reported the risk ratio (RR) for dichotomous outcomes and the relative change for continuous outcomes. Main results: We included 21 studies from Afghanistan, Burundi, China, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Tanzania, the United Kingdom, and the United States of health facilities providing primary health care and mental health care. There were three kinds of payment comparisons. 1) Pay for performance (P4P) combined with some existing payment method (capitation or different kinds of input-based payment) compared to the existing payment method We included 18 studies in this comparison, however we did not include five studies in the effects analysis due to high risk of bias. From the 13 studies, we found that the extra P4P incentives probably slightly improved the health professionals' use of some tests and treatments (adjusted RR median = 1.095, range 1.01 to 1.17; moderate-certainty evidence), and probably led to little or no difference in adherence to quality assurance criteria (adjusted percentage change median = -1.345%, range -8.49% to 5.8%; moderate-certainty evidence). We also found that P4P incentives may have led to little or no difference in patients' utilisation of health services (adjusted RR median = 1.01, range 0.96 to 1.15; low-certainty evidence) and may have led to little or no difference in the control of blood pressure or cholesterol (adjusted RR = 1.01, range 0.98 to 1.04; low-certainty evidence). 2) Capitation combined with P4P compared to fee-for-service (FFS) One study found that compared with FFS, a capitated budget combined with payment based on providers' performance on antibiotic prescriptions and patient satisfaction probably slightly reduced antibiotic prescriptions in primary health facilities (adjusted RR 0.84, 95% confidence interval 0.74 to 0.96; moderate-certainty evidence). 3) Capitation compared to FFS Two studies compared capitation to FFS in mental health centres in the United States. Based on these studies, the effects of capitation compared to FFS on the utilisation and costs of services were uncertain (very low-certainty evidence). Authors' conclusions: Our review found that if policymakers intend to apply P4P incentives to pay health facilities providing outpatient services, this intervention will probably lead to a slight improvement in health professionals' use of tests or treatments, particularly for chronic diseases. However, it may lead to little or no improvement in patients' utilisation of health services or health outcomes. When considering using P4P to improve the performance of health facilities, policymakers should carefully consider each component of their P4P design, including the choice of performance measures, the performance target, payment frequency, if there will be additional funding, whether the payment level is sufficient to change the behaviours of health providers, and whether the payment to facilities will be allocated to individual professionals. Unfortunately, the studies included in this review did not help to inform those considerations. Well-designed comparisons of different payment methods for outpatient health facilities in low- and middle-income countries and studies directly comparing different designs (e.g. different payment levels) of the same payment method (e.g. P4P or FFS) are needed.
Systematic Review Question»Systematic review of interventions
