Pay-for-performance (P4P) has been widely used around the world seeking to improve health outcomes, and in Brazil it is the basis of the National Program for Improving Access and Quality (PMAQ). The literature published between 1998 and January 2013 that evaluated the effectiveness of P4P to produce results or patterns of access and quality in health was scrutinized. A total of 138 studies, with the inclusion of a further 41 studies (14 systematic reviews, 07 clinical trials and 20 observational studies) were retrieved and analyzed Among the more rigorous studies, favorable conclusions for P4P were less frequent, whereas observational studies were more favorable to positive effects of P4P on the quality of, and access to, health services. Methodological limitations of observational studies may have contributed to these results, but the range of results is more linked to the conceptual and contextual aspects of the use of the P4P schemes reviewed, the heterogeneity of P4P models and results. P4P can be helpful in promoting the achievement of objectives in health care systems, especially in the short term and for specific actions requiring less effort of health care providers, but should be used with caution and with a rigorous planning model, also considering undesirable or adverse effects.
Background Low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) rely on available evidence when devising and implementing pharmaceutical policies. Aim of the review To provide a critical overview of systematic reviews of pharmaceutical policies, with particular focus on the relevance of such reviews in low- and middle-income countries. Methods A search for systematic reviews (SRs) of studies of the interventions of interest was conducted until May 2009 in MEDLINE, EconLit, CINAHL, the Cochrane site, ProQuest, EMBASE, JOLIS, ISI Web of Science, International Pharmaceutical Abstracts, International Network for Rational Use of Drugs, National Technical Information Service, Public Affairs Information Service, SourceOECD, the System for Information on Grey Literature in Europe, and the WHO library database. The search was updated to July 2013, based on the yields of the initial search strategy. Results 20 SRs that met all inclusion criteria were retrieved in full text. Four SRs were subsequently rejected on the basis of quality considerations and the findings of 16 SRs were extracted and their applicability in LMICs considered. Of these, 5 were Cochrane Reviews. All included SRs were published in English. SRs related to registration and classification policies, marketing policies, prescribing policies, reimbursement policies, policies on price and payments, co-payments and caps and multi-component policies were retrieved. No SRs related to patent and profit policies, sales and dispensing policies, policies that regulate the provision of health insurance, or policies on patient information were retrieved. Conclusion Only one of the systematic reviews retrieved utilised a study conducted in a developing country. The direct applicability of the evidence from these SRs in LMICs is limited. However, as middle-income countries move towards universal health coverage, the multi-component policies that govern reimbursement for medicines, and which impose caps on payments and co-payments by patients, may become more applicable. As such they will have direct implications for the practice of clinical pharmacy in such settings. Considerable effort will be needed to systemically review the available primary evidence from studies conducted in developing country settings, where such data exist.
BACKGROUND: There is considerable interest in the effectiveness of financial incentives in the delivery of health care. Incentives may be used in an attempt to increase the use of evidence-based treatments among healthcare professionals or to stimulate health professionals to change their clinical behaviour with respect to preventive, diagnostic and treatment decisions, or both. Financial incentives are an extrinsic source of motivation and exist when an individual can expect a monetary transfer which is made conditional on acting in a particular way. Since there are numerous reviews performed within the healthcare area describing the effects of various types of financial incentives, it is important to summarise the effectiveness of these in an overview to discern which are most effective in changing health professionals' behaviour and patient outcomes. OBJECTIVES: To conduct an overview of systematic reviews that evaluates the impact of financial incentives on healthcare professional behaviour and patient outcomes. METHODS: We searched the Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews (CDSR) (The Cochrane Library); Database of Abstracts of Reviews of Effectiveness (DARE); TRIP; MEDLINE; EMBASE; Science Citation Index; Social Science Citation Index; NHS EED; HEED; EconLit; and Program in Policy Decision-Making (PPd) (from their inception dates up to January 2010). We searched the reference lists of all included reviews and carried out a citation search of those papers which cited studies included in the review. We included both Cochrane and non-Cochrane reviews of randomised controlled trials (RCTs), controlled clinical trials (CCTs), interrupted time series (ITSs) and controlled before and after studies (CBAs) that evaluated the effects of financial incentives on professional practice and patient outcomes, and that reported numerical results of the included individual studies. Two review authors independently extracted data and assessed the methodological quality of each review according to the AMSTAR criteria. We included systematic reviews of studies evaluating the effectiveness of any type of financial incentive. We grouped financial incentives into five groups: payment for working for a specified time period; payment for each service, episode or visit; payment for providing care for a patient or specific population; payment for providing a pre-specified level or providing a change in activity or quality of care; and mixed or other systems. We summarised data using vote counting. MAIN RESULTS: We identified four reviews reporting on 32 studies. Two reviews scored 7 on the AMSTAR criteria (moderate, score 5 to 7, quality) and two scored 9 (high, score 8 to 11, quality). The reported quality of the included studies was, by a variety of methods, low to moderate. Payment for working for a specified time period was generally ineffective, improving 3/11 outcomes from one study reported in one review. Payment for each service, episode or visit was generally effective, improving 7/10 outcomes from five studies reported in three reviews; payment for providing care for a patient or specific population was generally effective, improving 48/69 outcomes from 13 studies reported in two reviews; payment for providing a pre-specified level or providing a change in activity or quality of care was generally effective, improving 17/20 reported outcomes from 10 studies reported in two reviews; and mixed and other systems were of mixed effectiveness, improving 20/31 reported outcomes from seven studies reported in three reviews. When looking at the effect of financial incentives overall across categories of outcomes, they were of mixed effectiveness on consultation or visit rates (improving 10/17 outcomes from three studies in two reviews); generally effective in improving processes of care (improving 41/57 outcomes from 19 studies in three reviews); generally effective in improving referrals and admissions (improving 11/16 outcomes from 11 studies in four reviews); generally ineffective in improving compliance with guidelines outcomes (improving 5/17 outcomes from five studies in two reviews); and generally effective in improving prescribing costs outcomes (improving 28/34 outcomes from 10 studies in one review). AUTHORS' CONCLUSIONS: Financial incentives may be effective in changing healthcare professional practice. The evidence has serious methodological limitations and is also very limited in its completeness and generalisability. We found no evidence from reviews that examined the effect of financial incentives on patient outcomes.
OBJECTIVE: Results-based financing and pay-for-performance refer to the transfer of money or material goods conditional on taking a measurable action or achieving a predetermined performance target. Results-based financing is widely advocated for achieving health goals, including the Millennium Development Goals.
METHODS: We undertook an overview of systematic reviews of the effectiveness of RBF. We searched the Cochrane Library, EMBASE, and MEDLINE (up to August 2007). We also searched for related articles in PubMed, checked the reference lists of retrieved articles, and contacted key informants. We included reviews with a methods section that addressed the effects of any results-based financing in the health sector targeted at patients, providers, organizations, or governments. We summarized the characteristics and findings of each review using a structured format.
RESULTS: We found 12 systematic reviews that met our inclusion criteria. Based on the findings of these reviews, financial incentives targeting recipients of health care and individual healthcare professionals are effective in the short run for simple and distinct, well-defined behavioral goals. There is less evidence that financial incentives can sustain long-term changes. Conditional cash transfers to poor and disadvantaged groups in Latin America are effective at increasing the uptake of some preventive services. There is otherwise very limited evidence of the effects of results-based financing in low- or middle-income countries. Results-based financing can have undesirable effects, including motivating unintended behaviors, distortions (ignoring important tasks that are not rewarded with incentives), gaming (improving or cheating on reporting rather than improving performance), widening the resource gap between rich and poor, and dependency on financial incentives.
CONCLUSION: There is limited evidence of the effectiveness of results-based financing and almost no evidence of the cost-effectiveness of results-based financing. Based on the available evidence and likely mechanisms through which financial incentives work, they are more likely to influence discrete individual behaviors in the short run and less likely to create sustained changes.
BACKGROUND: Norway is the lead promoter of results-based financing (RBF) as one of fi ve actions being taken as part of the Global Campaign for the Health Millennium Development Goals and plans to support the use of RBF through the World Bank and in bilateral agreements with selected countries focusing on achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of reducing child and maternal mortality (MDG 4 and 5). RBF-schemes can be targeted at different levels: recipients of healthcare, individual providers of healthcare, healthcare facilities, private sector organisations, public sector organisations, sub-national governments, and national governments. METHOD: This report consists of an overview of systematic reviews and a critical appraisal of four evaluations of RBF schemes in the health sector in low and middle-income countries (LMIC). RESULTS: Ten systematic reviews that met the inclusion criteria for this report were summarised. In addition, four evaluations of RBF schemes in LMIC were critically appraised, including financial incentives targeted at patients, individual providers, organisations, and governments. There are few rigorous studies of RBF and overall the evidence of its effects is weak.
• Financial incentives targeting recipients of healthcare and individual healthcare professionals appear to be effective in the short run for simple and distinct, well-defined behavioural goals. There is less evidence that financial incentives can sustain long-term changes.
• The use of RBF in LMIC has commonly been as part of a package that may include increased funding, technical support, training, changes in management, and new information systems. It is not possible to disentangle the effects of RBF and there is very limited quantitative evidence of RBF per se having an effect, other than in the context of conditional cash transfers to poor and disadvantaged groups in Latin America to motivate preventive care.
Pay-for-performance (P4P) has been widely used around the world seeking to improve health outcomes, and in Brazil it is the basis of the National Program for Improving Access and Quality (PMAQ). The literature published between 1998 and January 2013 that evaluated the effectiveness of P4P to produce results or patterns of access and quality in health was scrutinized. A total of 138 studies, with the inclusion of a further 41 studies (14 systematic reviews, 07 clinical trials and 20 observational studies) were retrieved and analyzed Among the more rigorous studies, favorable conclusions for P4P were less frequent, whereas observational studies were more favorable to positive effects of P4P on the quality of, and access to, health services. Methodological limitations of observational studies may have contributed to these results, but the range of results is more linked to the conceptual and contextual aspects of the use of the P4P schemes reviewed, the heterogeneity of P4P models and results. P4P can be helpful in promoting the achievement of objectives in health care systems, especially in the short term and for specific actions requiring less effort of health care providers, but should be used with caution and with a rigorous planning model, also considering undesirable or adverse effects.
