BACKGROUND: The use of blended payment schemes in primary care, including the use of financial incentives to directly reward ‘performance’ and ‘quality’ is increasing in a number of countries. There are many examples in the US, and the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QoF) for general practitioners (GPs) in the UK is an example of a major system-wide reform. Despite the popularity of these schemes, there is currently little rigorous evidence of their success in improving the quality of primary health care, or of whether such an approach is cost-effective relative to other ways to improve the quality of care.
OBJECTIVES: The aim of this review is to examine the effect of changes in the method and level of payment on the quality of care provided by primary care physicians (PCPs) and to identify:
i) the different types of financial incentives that have improved quality;
ii) the characteristics of patient populations for whom quality of care has been improved by financial incentives; and
iii) the characteristics of PCPs who have responded to financial incentives.
SEARCH STRATEGY: We searched the Cochrane Effective Practice and Organisation of Care (EPOC) Trials Register, Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials (CENTRAL) and Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews (CDSR) (The Cochrane Library), MEDLINE, HealthSTAR, EMBASE, CINAHL, PsychLIT, and ECONLIT. Searches of Internet-based economics and health economics working paper collections were also conducted. Finally, studies were identified through the reference lists of retrieved articles, websites of key organisations, and from direct contact with key authors in the field. Articles were included if they were published from 2000 to August 2009.
SELECTION CRITERIA: Randomised controlled trials (RCT), controlled before and after studies (CBA), and interrupted time series analyses (ITS) evaluating the impact of different financial interventions on the quality of care delivered by primary healthcare physicians (PCPs). Quality of care was defined as patient reported outcome measures, clinical behaviours, and intermediate clinical and physiological measures.
DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS: Two review authors independently extracted data and assessed study quality, in consultation with two other review authors where there was disagreement. For each included study, we reported the estimated effect sizes and confidence intervals.
MAIN RESULTS: Seven studies were included in this review. Three of the studies evaluated single-threshold target payments, one examined a fixed fee per patient achieving a specified outcome, one study evaluated payments based on the relative ranking of medical groups’ performance (tournament-based pay), one study examined a mix of tournament-based pay and threshold payments, and one study evaluated changing from a blended payments scheme to salaried payment. Three cluster RCTs examined smoking cessation; one CBA examined patients' assessment of the quality of care; one CBA examined cervical screening, mammography screening, and HbA1c; one ITS focused on four outcomes in diabetes; and one controlled ITS (a difference-in-difference design) examined cervical screening, mammography screening, HbA1c, childhood immunisation, chlamydia screening, and appropriate asthma medication. Six of the seven studies showed positive but modest effects on quality of care for some primary outcome measures, but not all. One study found no effect on quality of care. Poor study design led to substantial risk of bias in most studies. In particular, none of the studies addressed issues of selection bias as a result of the ability of primary care physicians to select into or out of the incentive scheme or health plan.
AUTHORS' CONCLUSIONS: The use of financial incentives to reward PCPs for improving the quality of primary healthcare services is growing. However, there is insufficient evidence to support or not support the use of financial incentives to improve the quality of primary health care. Implementation should proceed with caution and incentive schemes should be more carefully designed before implementation. In addition to basing incentive design more on theory, there is a large literature discussing experiences with these schemes that can be used to draw out a number of lessons that can be learned and that could be used to influence or modify the design of incentive schemes. More rigorous study designs need to be used to account for the selection of physicians into incentive schemes. The use of instrumental variable techniques should be considered to assist with the identification of treatment effects in the presence of selection bias and other sources of unobserved heterogeneity. In randomised trials, care must be taken in using the correct unit of analysis and more attention should be paid to blinding. Studies should also examine the potential unintended consequences of incentive schemes by having a stronger theoretical basis, including a broader range of outcomes, and conducting more extensive subgroup analysis. Studies should more consistently describe i) the type of payment scheme at baseline or in the control group, ii) how payments to medical groups were used and distributed within the groups, and iii) the size of the new payments as a percentage of total revenue. Further research comparing the relative costs and effects of financial incentives with other behaviour change interventions is also required.
BACKGROUND: Innovations are proliferating at the primary-secondary care interface, affecting referral to secondary care and resource use. Evidence about the range of effects and implications for the healthcare system of different types of innovation have not previously been summarised. AIM: To review the available evidence on initiatives affecting primary care referral to specialist secondary care. SETTING: Studies of primary-secondary care interface. METHOD: Systematic review of trials, using adapted Cochrane Collaboration (effective practice and organisation of care) criteria. Studies from 1980 to 2001 were identified from a wide range of sources. Strict inclusion criteria were applied, and relevant clinical, service and cost data extracted using an agreed protocol. The main outcome measures were referral rates to specialist secondary care. RESULTS: Of the 139 studies initially identified. 34 met the review criteria. An updated search added a further 10 studies. Two studies provided economic analysis only. Referral was not the primary outcome of interest in the majority of included studies. Professional interventions generally had an impact on referral rates consistent with the intended change in clinician behaviour. Similarly, specialist 'outreach' or other primary care-based specialist provider schemes had at least a small effect upon referral rates to secondary care with the direction of effect being that intended or rational from a clinical and sociological perspective. Of the financial interventions, one was aimed primarily at changing the numbers or proportion of referrals from primary to specialist secondary care, and the direction of change was as expected in all cases. The quality of the reporting of the economic components of the 14 studies giving economic data was poor in many cases. When grouped by intervention type, no overall pattern of change in referral costs or total costs emerged. CONCLUSION: The studies identified were extremely diverse in methodology, clinical subject, organisational form, and quality of evidence. The number of good quality evaluations of innovative schemes to enhance the existing capacity of primary care was small, but increasing. Well-evaluated service initiatives in this area should be supported. Organisational innovations in the structure of service provision need not increase total costs to the National Health Service (NHS), even though costs associated with referral may increase. This review provides limited, partial, and conditional support for current primary care-oriented NHS policy developments in the United Kingdom.
OBJECTIVE: To review the impact of payment systems on the behaviour of primary care physicians. METHODS: All randomised trials, controlled before and after studies, and interrupted time series studies that compared capitation, salary, fee-for-service or target payments (mixed or separately) that were identified by computerised searches of the literature. Methodological quality assessment and data extraction were undertaken independently by two reviewers using a data checklist. Study results were qualitatively analysed. RESULTS: Six studies met the inclusion criteria. There was considerable variation in the quality of reporting, study setting and the range of outcomes measured. Fee-for-service resulted in a higher quantity of primary care services provided compared with capitation but the evidence of the impact on the quantity of secondary care services was mixed. Fee-for-service resulted in more patient visits, greater continuity of care, higher compliance with a recommended number of visits, but lower patient satisfaction with access to a physician compared with salary payment. The evidence of the impact of target payment on immunisation rates was inconclusive. CONCLUSIONS: There is some evidence to suggest that how a primary care physician is paid does affect his/her behaviour but the generalisability of these studies is unknown. Most policy changes in the area of payment systems are inadequately informed by research. Future changes to doctor payment systems need to be rigorously evaluated.
Background: It is widely believed that the method of payment of physicians may affect their clinical behaviour. Although payment systems may be used to achieve policy objectives (e.g. cost containment or improved quality of care), little is known about the effects of different payment systems in achieving these objectives. Objectives: To evaluate the impact of different methods of payment (capitation, salary, fee for service and mixed systems of payment) on the clinical behaviour of primary care physicians (PCPs). Search methods: We searched the Cochrane Effective Practice and Organisation of Care Group specialised register; the Cochrane Controlled Trials Register; MEDLINE (1966 to October 1997); BIDS EMBASE (1980 to October 1997); BIDS ISI (1981 to October 1997); EconLit (1969 to October 1997); HealthStar (1975 to October 1997) Helmis (1984 to October 1997); health economics discussion paper series of the Universities of York, Aberdeen, Sheffield, Bristol, Brunel, and McMaster; Swedish Institute of Health Economics; RAND corporation; and reference lists of articles. Selection criteria: Randomised trials, controlled before and after studies and interrupted time series analyses of interventions comparing the impact of capitation, salary, fee for service (FFS) and mixed systems of payment on primary care physician satisfaction with working environment; cost and quantity of care; type and pattern of care; equity of care; and patient health status and satisfaction. Data collection and analysis: Two reviewers independently extracted data and assessed study quality. Main results: Four studies were included involving 640 primary care physicians and more than 6400 patients. There was considerable variation in study setting and the range of outcomes measured. FFS resulted in more primary care visits/contacts, visits to specialists and diagnostic and curative services but fewer hospital referrals and repeat prescriptions compared with capitation. Compliance with a recommended number of visits was higher under FFS compared with capitation payment. FFS resulted in more patient visits, greater continuity of care, higher compliance with a recommended number of visits, but patients were less satisfied with access to their physician compared with salaried payment. Authors' conclusions: It is noteworthy that so few studies met the inclusion criteria. There is some evidence to suggest that the method of payment of primary care physicians affects their behaviour, but the findings' generalisability is unknown. More evaluations of the effect of payment systems on PCP behaviour are needed, especially in terms of the relative impact of salary versus capitation payments.
We reviewed the published and unpublished international literature to determine the influence of salaried payment on doctor behaviour. We systematically searched Medline, BIDS Embase, Econlit and BIDS ISI and the reference lists of located papers to identify relevant empirical studies comparing salaried doctors with those paid by alternative methods. Only studies which reported objective outcomes and measures of the behaviour of doctors paid by salary compared to an alternative method were included in the review. Twenty-three papers were identified as meeting the selection criteria. Only one of the studies in this review reported a proxy for health status, but none examined whether salaried doctors differentiated between patients on the basis of health needs. Therefore, we were unable to draw conclusions on the likely impact of salaried payment on efficiency and equity. However, the limited evidence in our review does suggest that payment by salaries is associated with the lowest use of tests, and referrals compared with FFS and capitation. Salary payment is also associated with lower numbers of procedures per patient, lower throughput of patients per doctor, longer consultations, more preventive care and different patterns of consultation compared with FFS payment.
The use of blended payment schemes in primary care, including the use of financial incentives to directly reward ‘performance’ and ‘quality’ is increasing in a number of countries. There are many examples in the US, and the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QoF) for general practitioners (GPs) in the UK is an example of a major system-wide reform. Despite the popularity of these schemes, there is currently little rigorous evidence of their success in improving the quality of primary health care, or of whether such an approach is cost-effective relative to other ways to improve the quality of care.
OBJECTIVES:
The aim of this review is to examine the effect of changes in the method and level of payment on the quality of care provided by primary care physicians (PCPs) and to identify: i) the different types of financial incentives that have improved quality; ii) the characteristics of patient populations for whom quality of care has been improved by financial incentives; and iii) the characteristics of PCPs who have responded to financial incentives.
SEARCH STRATEGY:
We searched the Cochrane Effective Practice and Organisation of Care (EPOC) Trials Register, Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials (CENTRAL) and Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews (CDSR) (The Cochrane Library), MEDLINE, HealthSTAR, EMBASE, CINAHL, PsychLIT, and ECONLIT. Searches of Internet-based economics and health economics working paper collections were also conducted. Finally, studies were identified through the reference lists of retrieved articles, websites of key organisations, and from direct contact with key authors in the field. Articles were included if they were published from 2000 to August 2009.
SELECTION CRITERIA:
Randomised controlled trials (RCT), controlled before and after studies (CBA), and interrupted time series analyses (ITS) evaluating the impact of different financial interventions on the quality of care delivered by primary healthcare physicians (PCPs). Quality of care was defined as patient reported outcome measures, clinical behaviours, and intermediate clinical and physiological measures.
DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS:
Two review authors independently extracted data and assessed study quality, in consultation with two other review authors where there was disagreement. For each included study, we reported the estimated effect sizes and confidence intervals.
MAIN RESULTS:
Seven studies were included in this review. Three of the studies evaluated single-threshold target payments, one examined a fixed fee per patient achieving a specified outcome, one study evaluated payments based on the relative ranking of medical groups’ performance (tournament-based pay), one study examined a mix of tournament-based pay and threshold payments, and one study evaluated changing from a blended payments scheme to salaried payment. Three cluster RCTs examined smoking cessation; one CBA examined patients' assessment of the quality of care; one CBA examined cervical screening, mammography screening, and HbA1c; one ITS focused on four outcomes in diabetes; and one controlled ITS (a difference-in-difference design) examined cervical screening, mammography screening, HbA1c, childhood immunisation, chlamydia screening, and appropriate asthma medication. Six of the seven studies showed positive but modest effects on quality of care for some primary outcome measures, but not all. One study found no effect on quality of care. Poor study design led to substantial risk of bias in most studies. In particular, none of the studies addressed issues of selection bias as a result of the ability of primary care physicians to select into or out of the incentive scheme or health plan.
AUTHORS' CONCLUSIONS:
The use of financial incentives to reward PCPs for improving the quality of primary healthcare services is growing. However, there is insufficient evidence to support or not support the use of financial incentives to improve the quality of primary health care. Implementation should proceed with caution and incentive schemes should be more carefully designed before implementation. In addition to basing incentive design more on theory, there is a large literature discussing experiences with these schemes that can be used to draw out a number of lessons that can be learned and that could be used to influence or modify the design of incentive schemes. More rigorous study designs need to be used to account for the selection of physicians into incentive schemes. The use of instrumental variable techniques should be considered to assist with the identification of treatment effects in the presence of selection bias and other sources of unobserved heterogeneity. In randomised trials, care must be taken in using the correct unit of analysis and more attention should be paid to blinding. Studies should also examine the potential unintended consequences of incentive schemes by having a stronger theoretical basis, including a broader range of outcomes, and conducting more extensive subgroup analysis. Studies should more consistently describe i) the type of payment scheme at baseline or in the control group, ii) how payments to medical groups were used and distributed within the groups, and iii) the size of the new payments as a percentage of total revenue. Further research comparing the relative costs and effects of financial incentives with other behaviour change interventions is also required.
Systematic Review Question»Systematic review of interventions
